Larry Joe Boudreaux v. State of Utah : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Larry Joe Boudreaux v. State of Utah : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Andrew B. Berry, Jr.; Attorney for Appellant.
Mark E. Burns; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent State of Utah; Ross C. Blackham; San Pete County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Boudreaux v. Utah, No. 981787 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1912
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS" 
ooOoo r ° 
50 
.A10 
u i AM COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
NT 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent and A p p e l l e e . 
ooOoo 
DOCKET NO. W?7 
Case Number 98178^-CA 
Priority Number 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT EXTRADITING THE PETITIONER 
BY THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANPETE WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING 
MARK E. BURNS 
Attorney for Appellee 
160 East 300 South, #600 
Post Office Box 140841 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 801 366-0198 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309 
Attorney for Appellant 
62 West Main Street 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 801 436-8200 
FILED 
APR 1 2 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
VSi, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
ooOoo 
Case Number 981787-CA 
Priority Number 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT EXTRADITING THE PETITIONER 
BY THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANPETE WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING 
MARK E. BURNS 
Attorney for Appellee 
160 East 300 South, #600 
Post Office Box 140841 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 801 366-0198 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309 
Attorney for Appellant 
62 West Main Street 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 801 436-8200 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 7 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 24 
ARGUMENT 31 
THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
UPON HIS WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND UNDER UIFSA . . 31 
THE EXTRADITION ATTEMPT BY KENTUCKY AND 
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
RES JUDICATA 38 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER 
CHILD SUPPORT AND MR. BOUDREAUX'S CHILD SUPPORT 
HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COLLECTED 41 
MR. BOUDREAUX'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN 
VIOLATED AND HIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
SHOULD BE GRANTED 4 3 
MR. BOUDREAUX SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM INCARCERATION 
OR ADMITTED TO BAIL 4/ 
CONCLUSION 4 9 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
CASES 
Andrews v. Carver, 
789 F. Supp. 659 (D.Utah 1992) 40 
Baggs v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) 42 
Bryant v. Turner, 
431 P.2d 121 (Utah 1967) 45 
Burleiah v. Turner. 
38 P.2d 412 (Utah 1964) 39 
Cope v. Toronto. 
332 P.2d 977 (Utah 1958) 30, 32, 39, 45 
Dunn v. Cook, 
791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990) 45 
Emig v. Hayward. 
703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985) 49 
Farrow v. Smith. 
541 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1975) 32 
Gallegos v. Turner, 
409 P.2d 386 (Utah 1965) 46 
Gibson v. Morris, 
646 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982) 32 
Larrabee v. Turner, 
480 P.2d 134 (Utah 1971) 32 
Seeley v. Park, 
532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975) 25, 35 
State by and through Utah State Dept. Of Social Services v. 
SUCEC, 
924 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1996) 42 
ii 
State v. Child Support Enforcement, 
888 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah App. 1993) 29, 43 
Syddall v. Turner, 
437 P.2d 194 (Utah 1968) 32 
Wright v. Carver, 
886 P.2d 58 (Utah 1994) 40 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-22 35, 42 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-30-1, et seq 34 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-31-1, et seq 33, 35 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-45f-100, et seq 
25, 33, 34, 35, 36, 48 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 29, 50 
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 37, 47 
Article I, Section 8, of the Utah Constitution 37, 47 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 29, 50 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code 
Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(f), and by Rules 3 and 4, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and Rule 65, of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Petitioner and Appellant, LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, 
request this Honorable Court consider upon this appeal the issues 
which follow: 
1. Whether the Sixth Judicial District Court should have 
summarily deprived the Petitioner of his right to present evidence? 
Preserved at R. 144-146, 148; Tr. p.8 1. 6-7; p. 12, 1. 10-15; 
p.l3,1.14-p.l4, 1.9;p.20, 1.14-19;p.21, 1.16-p.22, 1.25; p. 57,1.1-
p.60,1.25; p.75, 1.13-16; p.80, 1.12-13; p.82, 1.10-25. 
2. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to 
present evidence upon the unconstitutional restraint upon his 
liberty and the denials of due process by the State of Kentucky and 
the State of Utah? Preserved at R.l-13, R. 48-76, R.144-146, 148; 
Tr. p.8 1. 6-7; p. 12, 1. 10-15; p.13,1.14-p.14, 1.9;p.20, 1.14-
19;p.21, 1.16-p.22, 1.25; p. 57,1.1-p.60,1.25; p.75, 1.13-16; p.80, 
1.12-13; p.82, 1.10-25. 
3. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to 
present testimony and documentary evidence as to the prior 
applications for habeas corpus by him and the action of the trial 
court thereupon? R. 1-47, R. 48-77, R. 148, R. 122-126; R. 143, 
148, Tr. p. 85, Tr. p. 100. 
4. Whether the Decree of Divorce entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Tooele County is the controlling law of 
the case? R.l-17, Tr. p. 115. 
5. Whether the laws of the State of Utah are the 
applicable laws of this action, or whether the State of Kentucky is 
without jurisdiction to extradite Mr. Boudreaux until the trial 
court renders a decision under UIFSA? R. 238, Tr. p.115. 
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6. Whether the collection of Mr. Boudreaux's child 
support by the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services, bars 
extradition under UCEA? R. 238, Tr. p.110-130. 
7. Whether the warrant and supporting documents 
submitted by the State of Kentucky are defective? R. 1-13. 
8. Whether the State of Kentucky is bound by URESA and 
UIFSA, and the Petition it filed for the collection of Mr. 
Boudreaux's child support obligation? Exhibit 3. 
9. Whether the assertion of false facts by officials of 
the State of Kentucky, and the State of Utah deprives Mr. Boudreaux 
of his right of due process? Tr. p. 78, 88. 
10. Whether the State of Kentucky's failure to properly 
serve Mr. Boudreaux with a Summons and Indictment or Information 
requiring his appearancee in it's court is a denial of his right of 
due process? Tr. p. 84-88. 
11. Whether the State of Utah, Office of Recovery 
Services has been successful in the collection of child support? R. 
1-13, 24, 45, 65-66; Exh. 3, Exh. 4; Tr. pp. 108-119. 
12. Whether the two (2), prior grants of writs of habeas 
corpus are res judicata in this proceeding? R. 9,147, Tr.pp. 89-96, 
119-120. 
13. Whether the restraint upon Mr. Boudreaux's liberty 
is unlawful? R.12. 
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14. Whether the prior dismissals with prejudice of the 
criminal informations and grants of the two (2), prior writs of 
habeas corpus based upon identical facts bars subsequent attempts 
by the State of Kentucky to extradite Mr. Boudreaux? R. 1-47, Tr. 
pp.89-96, 98. 
15. Whether Mr. Boudreaux is entitled to release from 
incarceration or release upon bail? R. 12; R.238, Tr. pp.22-38. 
16. Whether the affidavit of Joel C. Rich, and other 
documents from the State of Kentucky are defective in that they are 
not based upon his personal knowledge, are not supported by 
adequate documentation, have not been authenticated nor made before 
a magistrate, not duly certified and/or contain false and 
misleading facts? R. 7-9. 
17. Is the Warrant of the Govenor of the State of Utah 
defective and deficient upon it's face, and void? R. 1-13, R. 1-47, 
Tr. pp. 87-89. 
18. Did the trial court abuse it's discretion by 
ordering Mr. Boudreaux extradited to the State of Kentucky to stand 
trial upon a felony criminal charge? R. 182-186, 237. 
19. Is the restraint against Mr. Boudreaux's liberty 
unlawful and illegal, defective and deficient factually and upon 
it's face and therefore void as a matter of law? R.l-46. 
20. Should Mr. Boudreaux's Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus be summarily denied? R.131-148. 
4 
21. Should Mr. Boudreaux be permitted to present 
evidence? R.131-148. 
22. Did URESA, and does UIFSA, govern and provide the 
rights and duties of the demanding state, Kentucky, the asylum 
state, Utah, and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux? R.131-148. 
23. Whether Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45f-801, 
applies to this proceeding and how does the UIFSA statute apply? 
R.131-148. 
24. Should Mr. Boudreaux be permitted to present 
evidence and defenses pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-
45f-207, 209, 301, 303, 305, 316, 318, 401, 506, 604, 606, 607, 
613, and 614? R. 131-148. 
25. Is the Utah statute of limitations upon the 
collection of child support applicable to the proceeding and how is 
the statute applicable? R. 131-148. 
26. Do Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-45f-207, and 
604, provide that the laws of the State of Utah control and govern 
the nature, extent, amount, and duration of the current payments 
and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages 
under the child support order? R. 131-149. 
27. Did the former Sections 77-31-20, through 27, and 
UIFSA Sections 78-45f-207, 209, 301, 303, 305, 316, 318, 401, 604, 
606, 607, and 614 provide the authority, powers and duties of the 
trial court in this action and what is the trial court entitled to 
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find? R. 131-149. 
28. Are the traditional inquiries of the Emig v. 
Hayward, precedent expanded when an extradition action is based 
upon a UIFSA proceeding? R. 131-149. 
29. Is the presentation by the Petitioner, Mr. 
Boudreaux, of evidence and affirmative defenses inconsistent with 
UCEA, and should the presentation of evidence and defenses be 
permitted under UIFSA and UCEA? R. 131-149. 
30. Are Mr. Boudreauxf the State of Utah and the State 
of Kentucky bound by the provisions of the order of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court? Tr. p. 86, Exh. 1, 2(Proof of Claim); 
31. Must the State of Utah and the State of Kentucky 
comply with the provisions of UCEA and UIFSA? R. 1-47. 
32. Have the notice, due process and evidentiary 
requirements of UCEA and UIFSA been met? R. 1-46, 131-149. 
33. Should Mr. Boudreaux be awarded his damages, costs 
and attorney fees? R. 1-46. 
34. Should the trial court have made findings of fact 
and conclusions of law upon Mr. Boudreaux7s Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus? R. 156-174, 156. 
35. Should the trial court have made findings of fact 
and conclusions of law upon UIFSA, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 
78-45f-101,et seq.? R. 156-174, 156. 
36. Should the trial court have made findings of fact 
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and conclusions of law upon Mr. Boudreaux's request for release 
from incarceration, or release upon bail? R. 156-174, 156. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review governing the determination of 
each of the issues presented upon this appeal, because there are no 
factual disputes and because no particular deference is given to 
the trial court's rulings on questions of law, is the correction of 
error standaard. Shaw v. Layton Constr. Co., 872 P.2d 1059, 1061 
(Utah App. 1994); Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 
534 n.3 (Utah 1993); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah 
App. 1991); Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992); In 
re Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350, 1354 (Utah 1993); Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992); State v. Deli, 861 
P2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Waite, 803 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah 
App. 1990) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the 14th day of April, 1982, the Third Judicial 
District Court for Tooele County, within the State of Utah entered 
it's Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage to his then wife, 
Melanie Lynn Boudreaux. Paragraph three(3), of the Decree of 
Divorce ordered Larry Joe Boudreaux to pay child support in the 
amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), per month for hi minor 
child, Jo Lynn Boudreaux. R. 2. 
The Defendant in the divorce case, Melanie Lynn 
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Boudreaux, then took the minor child, Jo Lynn, and moved to the 
State of Kentucky. In January of 1998, Jo Lynn reached the age of 
eighteen (18), years. R. 3. 
Mr. Boudreaux's child support payment to Melanie Lynn 
Boudreaux is being and has been collected by the State of Utah, 
Office of Recovery Services. Admitted into evidence were the 
Office of Recovery Services for the State of Utah record of 
collection and payment of child support by Mr. Boudreaux. R. 3. 
On the 3rd day of November, 1993, the State of Utah upon 
the request of the State of Kentucky filed a criminal Information 
against Mr. Boudreaux alleging that he should be extradited and was 
a fugitive from justice from Kentucky where he was charged with 
flagrant non-support, case number 931600149. R. 4. 
Mr. Boudreaux was then arrested by the Sheriff of the 
County of Sanpete within the State of Utah and restrained of his 
liberty under the authority of and upon said warrant of the State 
of Kentucky and he was released upon an Undertaking of Bail. R. 5. 
On the 2nd day of February, 1994, Mr. Boudreaux filed in 
the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County his Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus asserting an unlawful restraint upon his 
liberty. R. 5. 
On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Sixth Judicial 
District Court entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
which were excepted into evidence. In paragraphs one (1), through 
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(9), the Court finds that Mr. Boudreaux did not flee the State of 
Kentucky, that he was and is not a fugitive from justice, that the 
affidavits supporting the extradition request from Kentucky are 
false and not true and that child support is being successfully 
collected by the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services under 
the Uniform Recoprical Enforcement of Support Act (URESA.) R. 5. 
On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Sixth Judicial 
District Court entered it's Order Upon the Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. A copy of the Order bearing the Court's filing stamp 
was excepted into evidence. The trial Court granted Mr. 
Boudreaux's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denied and 
quashed the Governor's Warrant. The Court ordered that the 
Information filed by the State of Utah alleging that he was a 
fugutive from justice was dismissed with prejudice. This decision 
was not appealed by the State of Utah nor the State of Kentucky and 
is binding thereupon. R.5-6. 
On the 1st day of March, 1994, the State of Utah upon the 
request for extradition of the State of Kentucky filed a second 
criminal Information against Mr. Boudreaux in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court alleging again that he was a fugutive from justice 
standing charged with Flagrant Non-Support in the State of 
Kentucky, case number 941600173. R. 6. 
Mr. Boudreaux again filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and a hearing was held thereupon on the 16th day of 
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November, 1994. On the 6th day of March, 1995, the Sixth Judicial 
District Court entered it's Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus granting Mr. Boudreaux's petition a second time and 
quashing, denying and dismissing with prejudice the 1994 
Information and Governor's Warrant requested by the State of 
Kentucky and the State of Utah. The Court, at paragraph five (5), 
incorporated it's prior Findings of Fact that the affidavits upon 
which the Kentucky request was based are false and not true. The 
Court, at paragraph six (6), of the order reserved the amount of 
his damages, costs and attorney fees incurred by him in the 
extradition proceedings. The State of Kentucky nor the State of 
Utah appealed the Findings of Fact and Order and they are binding 
thereupon. R. 6-7. 
On the 5th day of June, 1996, an Indictment, No. 96-CI-
00016, was again filed against Mr. Boudreaux a third time in 
Webster County within the State of Kentucky again charging him with 
Flagrant Non-Support, a Class D Felony. The Warrant of Arrest of 
the Webster County Circuit Court asserts that Mr. Boudreaux is a 
fugutive from justice. Mr. Boudreaux was not notified of the 
proceeding before the grand jury and was denied his right of due 
process thereby. The Warrant of Arrest indicates upon it's face 
that it is not bailable and thus the assumption that Mr. Boudreaux 
will be permitted bail in the State of Kentucky is rebutted, and 
denies Mr. Boudreaux of his right to bail. R. 7, 162. 
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On the 29th day of September, 1998, Mr. Boudeaux filed 
his third, and present, Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and the State did not file an answer to his petition. R.l-46. 
On October 30, 1998, the time set for trial of the 
Petition the trial court summarily dismissed Mr. Boudreaux's 
petition and refused to permit him to present evidence upon his 
assertions of the petition and the unconstutional restraint upon 
his liberty, and upon his UIFSA defenses. The Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order were signed by the trial court on 
November 25, 1998. 
On November 25, 1998, the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux filed 
his Notice of Appeal in the Sixth Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
a. Larry Joe Boudreaux, the Petitioner, is a resident 
of the County of Sanpete within the State of Utah. He is competent 
to testify if so called, and the facts which he stated in his 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are based upon his knowledge and 
personal observations. R. 2. 
b. Larry Joe Boudreaux was born on the 13th day of 
February, 1960, in Tooele County, Utah, and has since remained a 
permanent resident of the State of Utah. His residence address is 
87 West 600 South, in the City of Mount Pleasant in Sanpete County 
within the State of Utah. R. 2. 
c. Mr. Boudreaux has four (4), minor children who are 
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in his sole care, custody and control pursuant to an order of the 
Honorable Louis G. Tervort, of the Sixth Judicial District Court, 
a wife, Tammy, and two (2), stepchildren and all of whom rely soley 
upon him for their support, shelter, food and all of the other 
necessities of life. R. 2. 
d. On the 14th day of April, 1982, the Third Judicial 
District Court for Tooele County, within the State of Utah entered 
it's Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage to his then wife, 
Melanie Lynn Boudreaux. Paragraph three(3), of the Decree of 
Divorce ordered Larry Joe Boudreaux to pay child support in the 
amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00), per month for his minor 
child, Jo Lynn Boudreaux. R. 2. 
e. The Defendant in the divorce case, Melanie Lynn 
Boudreaux, then took the minor child, Jo Lynn, and moved to the 
State of Kentucky. In January of 1998, Jo Lynn reached the age of 
eighteen (18), years. R. 3. 
f. Mr. Boudreaux's child support payment to Melanie Lynn 
Boudreaux is being and has been collected by the State of Utah, 
Office of Recovery Services. Excepted into evidence were the 
Office of Recovery Services for the State of Utah record of 
collection and payment of child support by Mr. Boudreaux. R. 3. 
g. An Indictment in case number 9-CR-022, was issued 
against Mr. Boudreaux by a grand jury in the Webster County Circuit 
Court for the Commonwealth of Kentucky on the 14th day of October, 
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1993, charging that he committed the crime of Flagrant Non-Support, 
a class D felony in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes 530.050. 
Mr. Boudreaux first received and read this Indictiment on the 1st 
day of February, 1994. R. 3. 
h. Mr. Boudreaux was not afforded the opportunity of a 
hearing nor was he permitted to present evidence before the grand 
jury in the Webster County Circuit Court and as a result thereof he 
has been denied the right to due process of law afforded him by the 
Constitution of the United States of America, the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky and the State of Utah. R. 3-4. 
i. On the 3rd day of November, 1993, the State of Utah 
upon the request of the State of Kentucky filed a criminal 
Information against Mr. Boudreaux alleging that he was a fugitive 
from justice from Kentucky where he was charged with flagrant non-
support, case number 931600149. R. 4. 
j. On the 17th day of December, 1993, Michael 0. 
Leavitt, the Governor of the State of Utah, issued an extradition 
Warrant which required the arrest of Mr. Boudreaux. R. 4. 
k. Mr. Boudreaux was arrested by the Sheriff of the 
County of Sanpete within the State of Utah and restrained of his 
liberty under the authority of said warrant of the State of 
Kentucky and he was released upon an Undertaking of Bail. R. 5. 
1. On the 2nd day of February, 1994, Mr. Boudreaux filed 
in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County his 
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus asserting an unlawful restraint 
upon his liberty. R. 5. 
m. On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Sixth Judicial 
District Court entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
which were excepted into evidence. In paragraphs one (1), through 
(9), the Court finds that Mr. Boudreaux did not flee the State of 
Kentucky, that he was and is not a fugitive from justice, that the 
affidavits supporting the extradition request from Kentucky are 
false and not true and that child support is being successfully 
collected by the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services under 
the Uniform Recoprical Enforcement of Support Act (URESA.) R. 5. 
n. On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Sixth Judicial 
District Court entered it's Order Upon the Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus. A copy of the Order bearing the Court's filing stamp 
was admitted into evidence. The trial Court granted Mr. 
Boudreaux's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denied and 
quashed the Governor's Warrant. The Court ordered that the 
Information filed by the State of Utah alleging that he was a 
fugutive from justice was dismissed with prejudice. This decision 
was not appealed by the State of Utah nor the State of Kentucky and 
is binding thereupon. R.5-6. 
o. On the 1st day of March, 1994, the State of Utah upon 
the request of the State of Kentucky filed a second criminal 
Information against Mr. Boudreaux in the Sixth Judicial District 
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Court alleging again that he was a fugutive from justice standing 
charged with Flagrant Non-Support in the State of Kentucky, case 
number 941600173. R. 6. 
p. Mr. Boudreaux again filed his Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and a hearing was held thereupon on the 16th day of 
November, 1994. On the 6th day of March, 1995, the Sixth Judicial 
District Court entered it's Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus granting Mr. Boudreaux's petition a second time and 
quashing, denying and dismissing with prejudice the 1994 
Information and Governor's Warrant requested by the State of 
Kentucky and the State of Utah. The Court, at paragraph five (5), 
incorporated it's prior Findings of Fact that the affidavits upon 
which the Kentucky request was based are false and not true. The 
Court, at paragraph six (6), of the order reserved the amount of 
his damages, costs and attorney fees incurred by him in the 
extradition proceedings. The State of Kentucky nor the State of 
Utah appealed the Findings of Fact and Order and they are binding 
thereupon. R. 6-7. 
q. On the 5th day of June, 1996, an Indictment, No. 96-
CI-00016, was again filed against Mr. Boudreaux a third time in 
Webster County within the State of Kentucky again charging him with 
Flagrant Non-Support, a Class D Felony. The Warrant of Arrest of 
the Webster County Circuit Court asserts that Mr. Boudreaux is a 
fugutive from justice. Mr. Boudreaux was not notified of the 
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proceeding before the grand jury and was denied his right of due 
process thereby. The Warrant of Arrest indicates upon itfs face 
that it is not bailable and thus the assumption that Mr. Boudreaux 
will be permitted bail in the State of Kentucky is rebutted, and 
denies Mr. Boudreaux of his right to bail. R. 7, 162. 
r. The request for extradition by the State of Kentucky, 
the Indictment and Warrant of Arrest are based upon tne 
Supplelmental Affidavit of Prosecuting Attorney, Joel C. Rich. 
This affidavit is false and the facts stated therein are not true 
and this Honorable Court has entered it's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law finding that said facts are false in two (2), 
prior habeas corpus proceedings, referred to above. The affidavit 
is not based upon the personal knowledge and observations of the 
affiant and contain hearsay, conclusory statements. The assertions 
are not support by copies of the documents to which the assertions 
refer as required by the Rules of Evidence. The affidavit has not 
been authenticated by the Governor nor was the affidavit made 
before a magistrate as required by Utah Code Section 77-30-3. R. 7-
8. 
s. This is the third application for a writ of habeas 
corpus and two (2), prior applications for such a writ for the 
relief herein sought have been before made to and granted, quashing 
and dismissing with prejudice the two (2), prior Informations, 
Warrants of Arrest and requests for extradition by the State of 
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Kentucky upon identical facts. This present application to 
extradite Mr, Boudreaux is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, the law of the case, and violation of his 
constitutional rights of due process by the State of Utah and the 
State of Kentucky. R. 9. 
t. The warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah is 
defective and deficient upon it's face, and void, in that it states 
that Mr. Boudreaux has taken refuge in the State of Utah. R. 1-13. 
u. Mr. Boudreaux has never resided in nor has he ever 
been, even momentarily, in the State of Kentucky other than to get 
married to Melanie on the 6th day of July, 1979. Since 1979, he 
has not resided in, visited or at any time entered within the 
jurisdictional limits of the State of Kentucky. Thus, Mr. 
Boudreaux is not taking refuge in Utah as asserted in the 
governor's warrant, rendering it defective upon it's face. R. 9-10. 
v. Mr. Boudreaux has never been a fugitive nor has he 
fled from the justice of the State of Kentucky and taken refuge 
within the State of Utah which is falsly asserted in the Governor's 
Warrant. R.10. 
w. The warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah is 
deffective and deficient upon it's face, and void, in that the 
affidavit and other supporting documents are not authenticated as 
asserted in the warrant. 
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x. Mr. Boudreaux was not afforded the opportunity for a 
hearing nor to present evidence to the grand jury and thus he was 
denied his right of due process afforded him under the Constitution 
of the United States of America, the Constitution of the State of 
Utah and the Constitution of the State of Kentucky. He was not 
served with the Indictment nor any summons requiring his appearance 
at an arraignment in Kentucky. The present restraint upon his 
liberty by his incarceration in the Sanpete County Jail and the 
warrants of the State of Kentucky is a denial of his right of due 
process. 
y. Mr. Boudreaux's child support obligation is being 
collected successfully by the Office of Recovery Services for the 
State of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. Sections 77-31-1 et seq., as shown 
by the records of Recovery Services. R. 11-12. Addendum A-E. 
z. Mr. Boudreaux respectfully requested the trial Court 
discharge him from custody and repair and restore to him his 
liberty which has been unlawfully restrained by granting his 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and awarding Mr. Boudreaux his 
damages, costs and attorney fees. R. 12. 
aa. The State of Utah sought to deprive the Petitioner 
of a hearing upon his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and have 
the trial Court deny his petition summarily and transport him to 
the State of Kentucky to stand trial upon a crime of failure to pay 
his child support. The State of Utah also sought, by it's Motion 
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in Limine, to prevent the Petitioner from introducing his evidence. 
R, 52-62, 
bb. The trial court granted the Motion in Limine and 
summarily denied the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus refusing 
Larry Joe Boudreaux his right to present evidence upon his petition 
for writ of habeas corpus and pursuant to UIFSA. R. 238, Tr. p. 98. 
cc. On the 4th day of March, 1994, the Court ruled that 
the Petitioner's child support was being collected by the State of 
Utah through their URESA actions now pending. URESA has been 
repealed and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) , 
Sections 78-45f-100, et seq. was enacted in it's place. R. 1-46. 
dd. Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-31-1 et seq., the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, governed and 
provided the rights and duties of the demanding state, Kentucky, 
the asylum state, Utah, and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux at the 
time. The replacement statute, UIFSA, now provides the rights and 
duties of the demanding state, Kentucky, the asylum state, Utah, 
and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux. UIFSA also provides the 
authority, powers and duties of the trial court in this proceeding 
as did the predecessor statute. R.131-149. 
ee. At the time, U.C.A. Section 77-31-5, provided that, 
"the provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent 
herewith shall apply to any such demand although the person whose 
surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state at the time of 
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the commission of the crime and although he had not fled 
therefrom." R.131-149. 
ff. Like URESA, UIFSA provides at Section 78-45f-801(3), 
that, xx(3) A provision for extradition of individuals not 
inconsistent with this chapter applies to the demand even if the 
individual whose surrrender is demanded was not in the demanding 
state when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled 
therefrom." The provisions for extradition of the Petitionee 
Sections 77-30-1, et seq., apply when they are not inconsistent 
with UIFSA. Thus, the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, pursuant to 
UIFSA, Sections 78-45f-207, 78-45f-209, 78-45f-301, 78-45f-303, 78-
4 5f-305, 7 8-4 5f-316, 78-4 5f-318, 7 8-45f-4 01, 7 8-4 5f-506, 7 8-4 5f-
604, 78-45f-606 and 607, and 78-45f-613 and 614, is permitted to 
present evidence and defenses to this Honorable Court.R. 131-149. 
gg. The former U.C.A. Section 77-31-7, provided that the 
duties of support of the Petitioner are those of the State of Utah 
because Mr. Boudreaux was present in Utah during the period for 
which support is sought. Similarly, UIFSA, at Sections 78-45f-207, 
and 604, provide that the laws of the State of Utah control and 
govern the nature, extent, amount, and duration of the current 
payments and other obligations of support and the payment of 
arrearages under the order. In Utah the statute of limitations for 
child support arrearages is eight (8), years, under U.C.A. Section 
78-12-22. R. 131-149. 
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hh. The former, LLC.A, Section 77-31-20, provided that, 
"The Court shall conduct proceeding under this act in the manner 
prescribed by law for an action for the enforcement of the type of 
duty of support claimed. R. 131-149. 
ii. The former U.C.A. Sections 77-31-20, through 77-31-
27, provide for the powers and duties of this Honorable Court in 
determining support. Again similarly, UIFSA, sections 78-45f-207, 
209, 301, 303, 305, 316, 318, 401, 604, 606, 607, and 614, provides 
the authority, powers and duties of the District Court in this 
proceeding. The Court is entitled to find the amount Mr. Boudreaux 
owes in child support, order payment and take other actions to 
insure the payment of child support including, but not limited to, 
staying this proceeding. R. 131-149. 
jj. The claim of the State of Utah that the Petitioner 
is not permitted to present evidence is wrong because the UCEA 
applies only when it is not inconsistent with UIFSA. UIFSA permits 
the presentation of evidence and affirmative defenses. The 
Petitioner's sworn statements and attachments to his petition, and 
the prior Orders and Findings of Fact of the Court, all attached to 
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, show that the State of 
Utah, Office of Recovery Services, has been successful in 
collecting child support from the Petitioner. R. 131-149. 
kk. The State of Kentucky and the State of Utah have 
made two (2), prior requests for extradition of the Petitioner, 
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both of which have been denied by this Court. The facts before the 
District Court are identical as those in the two (2), prior 
extradition requests, except that the Petitioner has continued to 
pay his child support regularly since the state's prior attempts to 
extradite him. Two (2), prior petitions for writ of Habeas Corpus 
have been granted the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, based upon 
identical facts and law asserted by all parties to this action. 
Habeas Corpus is a civil remedy and because this Court has ruled 
heretofor on the state's requests for extradition the issues are 
res judicata. This matter has been dismissed with prejudice on two 
(2), prior occasions as shown by the two (2), Orders and Findings 
of this Court. The affidavit filed in this case in support of the 
extradition of the petitioner by the representative of the State of 
Kentucky contains facts identical to those asserted by Kentucky in 
the two (2), prior proceedings. The trial Court should have 
granted the petition based upon URCP 65B(c)(5), because there have 
been two (2), prior rulings on the legality of this restraint of 
the Petitioner's liberty. The doctrine of res judicate is 
applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. The burden is upon the 
State of Utah and the State of Kentucky to show that their 
extradition falls outside of the doctrine of res judicata. The 
petition of Mr. Boudreaux should have been granted summarily. R. 1-
46; R. 131-149. 
11. Mr. Boudreaux has paid and the State of Utah, Office 
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of Recovery Services, under URESA and UIFSA, have successfully 
collected the child support for the child of Mr. Boudreaux who was 
eighteen (18), years old in January, 1998. This is shown by the 
records of the Office of Recovery Services which are attached to 
his petition. Any arrearage is being paid under the jurisdiction 
of the United States Bankruptcy Court. The Order of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah was admitted into 
evidence. Mr. Boudreaux cannot pay monies outside of the confines 
of payment ordered in the Bankruptcy Court Order. R. 1-46, 131-149. 
mm. The State of Kentucky and the State of Utah must 
comply with the requirements of both UIFSA and UCEA. They have 
failed to do so. Mr. Boudreaux has had no notice of enforcement 
action against him pursuant to UIFSA. The notice and evidentary 
requirements of neither UIFSA nor UCEA have been met. The 
extradition documents submitted by the State of Utah and the State 
of Kentucky are facially defective and the facts asserted therein 
are false, as asserted in the Statement of Facts above.R. 131-149. 
nn. On September 29, 1998, Mr. Boudreaux filed his 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State of Utah and the 
State of Kentucky have failed to timely file an answer to the sworn 
petition of Mr. Boudreaux. The Petitioner requested that the 
State's default be entered and that his petition be granted. URCP 
65B(c)(6). R.131-149. 
oo. Otherwise, the Petitioner requests that he be 
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permitted to present evidence upon the allegations of his petition, 
that his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be granted and that the 
extradition be quashed and again denied with prejudice. R. 1-13. 
pp. The Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, respectfully 
requested that he be awarded his damages, costs and attorney fees 
incurred in this action which is meritless and pursued in bad 
faith. R. 1-13. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah, in the trial court, sought to deprive 
the Petitioner of a hearing and the presentation of evidence upon 
his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and have the trial court 
deny his petition summarily and transport him to the State of 
Kentucky to stand trial upon a crime of failure to pay his child 
support. The trial court granted the State of Utah's motion to 
dismiss the petition without permitting Mr. Boudreaux to present 
evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon the allegations of his 
petition wherein he asserted that he was denied due process of law. 
Mr. Boudreaux should have been permitted to present evidence upon 
but was not permitted to present evidence that he was not served 
with nor provided notice of any arraignment in Kentucky, that the 
affidavits of Joel Rich and Thomas Simpson in support of the 
rendition were false, and that he had not "'taken refuge in the 
State of Utah," as asserted in the Warrant of the Governor of the 
State of Utah. Mr. Boudreaux should have been permitted to present 
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evidence upon but was not permitted by the trial court to present 
evidence upon the two (2), prior attempts to extradite him by the 
State of Kentucky upon identical claims and the granting by the 
trial court of his two (2), prior habeas corpus petitions which 
blocked both of Kentucky's attempts at extradition. 
UIFSA provides at Section 78-45f-801(3) , that, "(3) A 
provision for the extradition of individuals not inconsistent with 
this chapter applies to the demand even if the individual whose 
surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state when the crime 
was allegedly committed and has not fled therefrom." The 
provisions for extradition of the Petitioner, U.C.A. Sections 77-
30-1 et seq., apply when they are not inconsistent with UIFSA. 
Thus, the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, pursuant to UIFSA, Sections 
78-45f-207, 78-45f-209, 78-45f-301, 78-45f-303, 78-45f-305, 78-45f-
316, 7 8-45f-318, 78-4 5f-4 01, 7 8-4 5f-506, 7 8-4 5f-604, 78-45f-606, 
78-45f-607, and 78-45f-613 and 78-45f-614, is permitted to present 
evidence and defenses to the trial court. 
UIFSA, at Sections 78-45f-207, and 604, provide that the 
laws of the State of Utah control the proceeding and govern the 
nature, extent, amount, and duration of the current payments and 
other obligations of support and the payment arrearages under the 
Utah divorce decree. In Utah the statute of limitations for child 
support arrearages is eight (8), years, under U.C.A. Section 78-12-
22. Seelev v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975). 
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The order of the trial court summarily dismissing Mr. 
Boudreaux's Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
prohibiting him from presenting his documentary and testimonial 
evidence must be reversed. The failure of the trial court to 
permit the Petitioner to present evidence of the denials of his 
rights of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the other 
UIFSA evidence he proffered, is itself a denial of Mr. Boudreaux's 
right of due process. Alternatively, the appellate court should 
instruct the trial court to make findings of fact based upon the 
evidence profferred by Mr. Boudreaux and his witnesses inasmuch as 
the State of Utah did not present any evidence in the proceeding, 
or at trial, whatsoever. 
The State of Kentucky and the State of Utah have made two 
(2), prior attempts to extradite the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, 
both of which were denied by the trial court. R. 5-9, 18-22, 23-25, 
26-27, 28-30. The facts before the trial court upon the present, 
and third, attempt to extradite the Petitioner are identical as 
those in the two (2), prior extradition requests by the State of 
Kentucky and the State of Utah, except that the Petitioner has 
continued to pay his child support regularly since the prior 
attempts to extradite him. R. 7-9. Two (2), prior petitions for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus have been granted the Petitioner, Mr. 
Boudreaux, based upon identical facts and law asserted by all 
parties to this action. Habeas Corpus is a civil remedy and 
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because the trial court had ruled heretofor on the state's requests 
for extradition the issues are res judicata. The matter had been 
dismissed with prejudice on two (2), prior occasions as shown by 
the two (2), Orders and Findings of the trial court. R. 5-9, 18-22, 
23-25, 26-27, 28-30. The State of Kentucky nor the State of Utah 
presented any evidence whatsoever in the proceeding regarding Mr. 
Boudreaux's res judicata defense. Tr. 89-98. The trial court 
took judicial notice of and in case numbers 931600149, 940600581, 
and 940600636, ruled that the restraint upon the liberty of Mr. 
Boudreaux was illegal and violated his constitutional right of due 
process. Tr. p. 119-123. The two prior grants of habeas corpus to 
Mr. Boudreaux upon the basis of false facts stated in affidavits of 
Thomas Simpson, his filing of an affidavit in support of the 
present attempt at extradition, and the prior rulings of the trial 
court that the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services has been 
successfully collecting child support from Mr. Boudreaux, entitle 
Mr. Boudreaux to assert the defense of res judicata, and to present 
evidence and affirmative defenses. The Petition of Mr. Boudreaux 
should have been granted summarily given that the State of Utah and 
the State of Kentucky failed to file an answer to the petition and 
failed to present any evidence whatsoever controverting the sworn 
assertions of Mr. Boudreaux, his documentary evidence and his 
witnesses (which were proffered and excepted into evidence by the 
trial court for the purpose of appeal. Tr. pp. 119-123.) 
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Mr. Boudreaux has paid and the State of Utah, Office of 
Recovery Services have successfully collected the Utah ordered 
child support for the child of Mr. Boudreaux who was eighteen (18), 
years old in January, 1998. This is shown by the records of the 
Office of Recovery Services which are attached to his sworn 
petition. R. 31-38. It is also proved by the records of the State 
of Utah, Office of Recovery Services that were excepted and 
proffered into evidence at the hearing. Exhibit 4, and Exhibit 2. 
The State presented no documents, proffered no witnesses and 
presented no evidence conrotverting Mr. Boudreaux's assertion of 
successful collection of child support. 
Payments toward the child support arrearage by Mr. 
Boudreaux ceased in March, 1998, until October, 1998, when the 
Office of Recovery Services received a payment $519.26, from the 
United States Bankruptcy Court Trustee in Mr. Boudreaux's Chapter 
13, case pursuant to the proof of claim of Recovery Services for 
arrearages. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2, Proof of Claim; Exhibit 4, p.l, 
payment for October, 1998. The Chapter 13 plan of Mr. Boudreaux 
and the Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court provides that 
the child support arrears will be paid in full by Mr. Boudreaux and 
the United States Trustee. 
Moreover, Kentucky has no jurisdiction over the 
collection of child support arrearages, criminal or civil, ordered 
by a Utah Decree of Divorce and collected by the State of Utah, 
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Office of Recovery Services. The district courts of Utah have 
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the collection of past 
due child support. State v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d 
960, 963 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America provides, "No person shall be... deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America provides, "...nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law..." 
Mr. Boudreaux asserted in his sworn petition the 
unconsitiutional restraint upon his liberty by his arrest and 
incarceration in the Sanpete County Jail by the rendition request 
of the State of Kentucky and the actions of the State of Utah. R. 
3-13. 
He was not notified of any Kentucky grand jury 
proceedings against him. R. 1-13, R. 184. He was not notified on 
any arraignment proceeding in Kentucky enabling him to appear 
before the Kentucky court. R. 1-13, R. 184, R. 111-125, R. 121. 
The warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah refers to Mr. 
Boudreaux as having taken refuge in Utah presumably in order to 
avoid prosecution of a crime in Kentucky. The statement is false. 
Mr. Boudreaux has always resided and been domociled in the State of 
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Utah. R. 1-13. The State of Utah nor the State of Kentucky 
presented controverting evidence that Mr. Boudreaux was notified of 
an arraignment, or grand jury proceedings nor that Mr. Boudreaux 
had taken refuge in the State of Utah. 
The failure by the State of Kentucky to notify Mr. 
Boudreaux of an arraignment proceeding, and the issuance of a no 
bail warrant for his arrest based upon his failure to appear and 
the arraignment, and his arrest upon such a warrant, is a violation 
of his rights of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America. Mr. Boudreaux was arrested in Sanpete County on August 
24, 1998, and today remains deprived of his liberty in the Sanpete 
County Jail. 
The affidavits of Mr. Thomas Simpson and Mr. Joel Rich 
which state false facts. R. 1-46. When there is fraud, falsity, 
bad faith, clear default, or abuse in the performance of a duty a 
court should interfere in the manner in which an executive 
authority performs it's duties prescribed by law. Cope v. Toronto, 
332 P.2d 977 (Utah 1958). 
On December 7, 1998, Mr. Boudreaux requested that the 
trial court release him from incarceration in the Sanpete County 
Jail, or otherwise admit him to bail. R. 238, Tr. pp. 21-41. The 
trial court denied Mr. Boudreaux's release from incarceration and 
denied his request for bail. R.238, Tr. pp. 39-41. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE 
UPON HIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND UIFSA 
The State of Utah, in the trial court, sought to deprive 
the Petitioner of a hearing and the presentation of evidence upon 
his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and have the trial court 
deny his petition summarily and transport him to the State of 
Kentucky to stand trial upon a crime of failure to pay his child 
support. The trial court granted the State of Utah's motion to 
dismiss the petition without permitting Mr. Boudreaux to present 
evidence, testimony and documentary, upon the allegations of his 
petition wherein he asserted that he was denied due process of law. 
Mr. Boudreaux should have been permitted to present evidence upon 
but was not permitted to present evidence that he was not served 
with nor provided notice of any arraignment in Kentucky, that the 
affidavits of Joel Rich and Thomas Simpson in support of the 
rendition were false, and that he had not "taken refuge in the 
State of Utah," as asserted in the Warrant of the Governor of the 
State of Utah. Mr. Boudreaux should have been permitted to present 
evidence upon but was not permitted by the trial court to present 
evidence upon the two (2), prior attempts to extradite him by the 
State of Kentucky upon identical claims and the granting by the 
trial court of his two (2), prior habeas corpus petitions which 
blocked both of Kentucky's attempts at extradition. A person 
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incarcerated in Utah may use the habeas corpus remedy to challenge 
the effect in Utah of a detainer or rendition request filed by 
another state and a proposed transfer of custody thereto. Gibson v. 
Morris, 646 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982) . In such a habeas corpus 
proceeding the burden of proof is upon the petitioner. Syddall v. 
Turner, 437 P.2d 194 (Utah 1968). In a trial upon a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus the burden is upon the petitioner to present 
evidence that he is wrongfully incarcerated. Farrow v. Smith, 541 
p.2d 1107 (Utah 1975); Larrabee v. Turner, 480 P.2d 134 (Utah 
1971) . When there is fraud, falsity, bad faith or abuse in the 
performance of duty by a state official the courts will interfere 
in the manner in which an executive department performs it's duties 
prescribed by law. Cope v. Toronto, 332 P.2d 977 (Utah 1958). The 
Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, in his sworn Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus asserted that the affidavits in support of the 
request for extradition were false and asserted false fact. R. 7-9. 
Mr. Boudreaux asserted the prior findings of the trial court in the 
two (2), prior habeas corpus proceedings that the facts asserted by 
the officials of the State of Kentucky were false. R. 7-9, 23-25, 
26-27, 28-30. In order to meet his evidentiary burden at trial 
upon his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mr. Boudreaux should 
have been permitted by the trial court to present his documentary 
evidence and the testimony of his witnesses. Larrabee, id. Farrow, 
id. Tr. p.8 1. 6-7; p. 12, 1. 10-15; p.13,1.14-p.14, 1.9;p.20, 
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1.14-19;p.21, 1.16-p.22, 1.25; p. 57,1.1-p.60,1.25; p.75, 1.13-16; 
p.80, 1.12-13; p.82, 1.10-25. 
On the 4th day of March, 1994, the trial court made it's 
findings of fact and ruled that the Petitioner's child support was 
being collected by the State of Utah through it's URESA actions 
then pending and that each of the affidavits upon which the 
Governor's Warrant was issued are defective and false and the facts 
stated in said affidavits are not true. R. 23-25. URESA has been 
repealed and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 
U.C.A. Sections 78-45f-100, et seq., was enacted in it's place. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-31-1 et seq., the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, governed and 
provided the rights and duties of the demanding state, Kentucky, 
the asylum state, Utah, and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux at the 
time of the two (2), prior extradition attempts and habeas corpus 
proceedings. The replacement statute, UIFSA, now provides the 
rights and duties of the demanding state, Kentucky, the asylum 
state, Utah, and the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux. UIFSA also 
provides the authority, powers and duties of the trial court in 
this proceeding as did the predecessor statute. 
At the time of the State of Kentucky's two (2), prior 
attempts to extradite the Petitioner, and Mr. Boudreaux's two (2), 
previous proceedings upon his Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-31-5, provided that, "the 
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provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith 
shall apply to any such demand although the person whose surrender 
is demanded was not in the demanding state at the time of the 
commission of the crime and although he had not fled therefrom." 
Like the former URESA, UIFSA provides at Section 78-45f-
801 (3)f that, "(3) A provision for the extradition of individuals 
not inconsistent with this chapter applies to the demand even if 
the individual whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding 
state when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled 
therefrom." The provisions for extradition of the Petitioner, 
U.C.A. Sections 77-30-1 et seq., apply when they are nnot 
inconsistent with UIFSA. Thus, the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, 
pursuant to UIFSA, Sections 78-45f-207, 78-45f-209, 78-45f-301, 78-
4 5f-303, 7 8-45f-305, 78-45f-316f 7 8-45f-318, 7 8-45f-4 01, 7 8-45f-
506, 78-45f-604, 78-45f-606, 78-45f-607, and 78-45f-613 and 78-45f-
614, is permitted to present evidence and defenses to the trial 
court. 
The former U.C.A. Section 77-31-7, provided that the 
duties of support of the Petitioner are those required by the State 
of Utah because Mr. Boudreaux was present in Utah during the period 
for which support is sought. Similarly, UIFSA, at Sections 78-45f-
207, and 604, provide that the laws of the State of Utah control 
the proceeding and govern the nature, exttent, amount, and duration 
of the current payments and other obligations of support and the 
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payment arrearages under the Utah divorce decree. In Utah the 
statute of limitations for child support arrearages is eight (8), 
years, under U.C.A. Section 78-12-22. Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1975). The Decree of Divorce which ordered the payment of 
child support by the Petitioner was issued by the Third Judicial 
District Court for Tooele County within the State of Utah. The 
State of Utah, through it's Office of Recovery Services has been 
collecting Mr. Boudreaux's child support on behalf of the State of 
Kentucky at the request of Kentucky by it's Interstate Child 
Support Enforcement Transmittal dated September 24, 1991, wherein 
Kentucky asserted a total child support arrearage of $3,784.00, as 
of August 1, 1991. Exhibit 2. 
The former, U.C.A. Section 77-31-20, provided that, "The 
Court shall conduct a proceeding under this act in the manner 
prescribed by law for an action for the enforcement of the type of 
duty of support claimed. The claimant was Kentucky and the trial 
court permitted the presentation of testimony and documentary 
evidence in the two (2), prior proceedings and entered Findings of 
Fact thereupon. R. 1-46. 
The former U.C.A. Sections 77-31-20, through 77-31-27, 
provided for the powers and duties of the trial court in 
determining child support issues and facts. Again similarly, 
UIFSA, sections 78-45f-207, 209, 301, 303, 305, 316, 318, 401, 604, 
606, 607, 607, and 614, provide the authority, powers and duties of 
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the trial court in this proceeding. The trial court was entitled 
to find the amount Mr. Boudreaux owes in child support., order 
payment and take other actions to insure the payment of child 
support including, but not limited to, staying the proceeding. 
The claim of the State of Utah that the Petitioner is not 
permitted to present evidence is wrong because the UCEA applies 
only when it is not inconsistent with UIFSA. U.C.A. Section 78-
45f-801(3). UIFSA permits the presentation of evidence and 
affirmative defenses. The Petitioner's sworn statements in his 
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, together with the 
attachments thereto, the records of the Office of Recovery Services 
of the State of Utah, the prior orders and Findings of Fact of the 
trial court in the prior habeas corpus proceeding all show that the 
Office of Recovery Services has been successful in collecting child 
support from the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux. 
It must be noted here that the State of Utah presented no 
documentary nor testimonial evidence at the trial upon the Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, nor did the State proffer any evidence 
which would controvert the evidence proffered and sworn statements 
by Mr. Boudreaux. 
The trial court granted the State of Utah's motion to 
dismiss Mr. Boudreaux's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and 
deny the writ summarily, without allowing the Petitioner to present 
evidence in support of the petition. Tr. p. 98. The trial court, 
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after dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus, allowed 
the submission of documentary evidence and the testimony of Mr. 
Boudreaux's witnesses for the sole purpose of protecting the record 
for appeal. Tr. pp. 98-100. Mr. Boudreaux proffered his own 
testimony (Tr. pp. 100-102), the testimony of his bankruptcy 
counsel, Mr. Enderton, (Tr. pp. 102-108), the testimony of Mr. Glen 
Frandsen of the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services, and the 
testimony of Assistant Attorney General for Recovery Services, 
Lance Dean. (Tr. pp. 108-119.) The trial court also, upon the 
exception of the Petitioner, permitted the admission of 
Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5, into the record (Tr. p. 122), and took 
judicial notice of the two (2), prior extradition attempts by the 
State of Kentucky and the two (2), prior habeas corpus proceedings 
before the trial court, case numbers 931600149, 940600636, 
941600173, 941600581, and 981600111. (Tr. pp. 119-121.) 
The order of the trial court summarily dismissing Mr. 
Boudreaux's Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
prohibiting him from presenting his documentary and testimonial 
evidence must be reversed. The failure of the trial court to 
permit the Petitioner to present evidence of the denials of his 
rights of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the other 
UIFSA evidence he proffered, is itself a denial of Mr. Boudreaux's 
right of due process. Alternatively, the appellate court should 
instruct the trial court to make findings of fact based upon the 
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evidence profferred by Mr. Boudreaux and his witnesses inasmuch as 
the State of Utah did not present any evidence in the proceeding, 
or at trial, whatsoever. 
THE EXTRADITION ATTEMPT BY KENTUCKY AND 
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ARE RES JUDICATA 
The State of Kentucky and the State of Utah have made two 
(2), prior attempts to extradite the Petitioner, Mr. Boudreaux, 
both of which were denied by the trial court. R. 5-9, 18-22, 23-25, 
26-27, 28-30. The facts before the trial court upon the present, 
and third, attempt to extradite the Petitioner are identical as 
those in the two (2), prior extradition requests by the State of 
Kentucky and the State of Utah, except that the Petitioner has 
continued to pay his child support regularly since the prior 
attempts to extradite him. R. 7-9. Two (2), prior petitions for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus have been granted the Petitioner, Mr. 
Boudreaux, based upon identical facts and law asserted by all 
parties to this action. Habeeas Corpus is a civil remedy and 
because the trial court had ruled heretofor on the state's requests 
for extradition the issues are res judicata. The matter had been 
dismissed with prejudice on two (2), prior occasions as shown by 
the two (2), Orders and Findings of the trial court. R. 5-9, 18-22, 
23-25, 26-27, 28-30. 
Utah and Kentucky assert that their present extradition 
attempt is not res judicata because in the two (2), prior 
applications for extradition, Mr. Boudreaux was identified as a 
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fugitive from justice having taken refuge in the State of Utah, and 
in the present extradition attempt he is identified as a non-
fugitive having taken refuge in the State of Utah. The change of 
a single word in the application by the State of Kentucky and the 
State of Utah do not prohibit application of the equitable defense 
of res judicata. The facts of the present attempt at extradition 
are the same as the facts of the two (2), prior attempts at 
extradition of Mr. Boudreaux. The trial court previously ruled and 
made findings of fact that, "Each of the affidavits upon which the 
Governor's Warrant was issued are defective and false and the facts 
stated therein are not true." R. 24, paragraph 8. Substantively, 
the factual claims of the State of Kentucky in the present attempt 
at extradition are identical to the facts of the prior attempts at 
extradition. Mr. Boudreaux asserted in his sworn petition that the 
facts asserted in the affidavits supporting rendition are false and 
supported his claim with the records of the Office of Recovery 
Services. R. 1-46. The State of Kentucky, when it requested 
interstate child support enforcement, Exhibit 2, asserted child 
support arrearages of $3,784.00 as of August 1, 1991, directly 
controverting the factual assertion of the affidavits supporting 
the present request for extradition. Exhibit 2. 
The doctrine of res judicate is applicable to habeas 
corpus proceedings and should have been applied here by the trial 
court, or at least considered. Burleiah v. Turner, 38 P.2d 412 
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(Utha 1964); Wright v. Carver, 886 P.2d 58 (Utah 1994); Andrews v. 
Carver, 789 F. Supp. 659 (D.Utah 1992). The burden is upon the 
State of Utah and the State of Kentucky to show that their present 
extradition attempt and Mr. Boudreaux's present Verified Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus falls outside of the doctrine of res 
judicata. The State of Kentucky nor the State of Utah presented 
any evidence whatsoever in the proceeding regarding Mr. Boudreaux's 
res judicata defense. Tr. 89-98. The doctrine of res judicata in 
habeas corpus proceedings does not only work to the benefit of the 
state. The application of the equitable doctrine of res judicata 
should apply equitably and to the benefit and detriment of all of 
the parties to this action. If the issues have been previously 
determined by the trial court in two (2), prior proceedings then 
the Petitioner should have the benefit of the application of the 
doctrine of res judicata in subsequent cases involving unlawful 
restraints upon his liberty. Tr. 89-96. The trial court took 
judicial notice of and in case numbers 931600149, 940600581, and 
940600636, ruled that the restraint upon the liberty of Mr. 
Boudreaux was illegal and violated his constitutional right of due 
process. Tr. p. 119-123. The two prior grants of habeas corpus to 
Mr. Boudreaux upon the basis of false facts stated in affidavits of 
Thomas Simpson, his filing of an affidavit in support of the 
present attempt at extradition, and the prior rulings of the trial 
court that the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services has been 
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successfully collecting child support from Mr. Boudreaux, entitle 
Mr. Boudreaux to assert the defense of res judicata, and to present 
evidence and affirmative defenses. The Petition of Mr. Boudreaux 
should have been granted summarily given that the State of Utah and 
the State of Kentucky failed to file an answer to the petition and 
failed to present any evidence whatsoever controverting the sworn 
assertions of Mr. Boudreaux, his documentary evidence and his 
witnesses (which were proffered and excepted into evidence by the 
trial court for the purpose of appeal. Tr. pp. 119-123.) The 
present extradition attempt by the State of Kentucky is unsupported 
and in light of the prior proceedings, frivolous. 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CHILD SUPPORT 
AND MR. BOUDREAUX'S CHILD SUPPORT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COLLECTED 
Mr. Boudreaux has paid and the State of Utah, Office of 
Recovery Services have successfully collected the Utah ordered 
child support for the child of Mr. Boudreaux who was eighteen (18), 
years old in January, 1998. This is shown by the records of the 
Office of Recovery Services which are attached to his sworn 
petition. R. 31-38. It is also proved by the records of the State 
of Utah, Office of Recovery Services that were excepted and 
proffered into evidence at the hearing. Exhibit 4, and Exhibit 2. 
The State presented no documents, proffered no witnesses and 
presented no evidence conrotverting Mr. Boudreaux's assertion of 
successful collection of child support. 
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The Recovery Services records show that Mr. Boudreaux 
paid his ongoing child support, and often paid his ongoing 
obligation together with substantial contributions toward his child 
support arrearages. Exhibit 4. His ongoing obigation ceased in 
January, 1998. 
Payments toward the child support arrearage by Mr. 
Boudreaux ceased in March, 1998, until October, 1998, when the 
Office of Recovery Services received a payment $519.26, from the 
United States Bankruptcy Court Trustee in Mr. Boudreaux's Chapter 
13, case pursuant to the proof of claim of Recovery Services for 
arrearages. Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2, Proof of Claim; Exhibit 4, p.l, 
payment for October, 1998. The Chapter 13 plan of Mr. Boudreaux 
and the Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court provides that 
the child support arrears will be paid in full by Mr. Boudreaux and 
the United States Trustee. One Hundred percent (100%), payment of 
Mr. Boudreaux's Utah ordered child support obligation, including 
arrearages, is. successful collection of his child support. 
Generally, debts are subject to discharge in a bankruptcy 
proceeding but an exception exists when the debt is child support 
arrearages. Baaas v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141,143 (Utah 1974); State 
by and through Utah State Dept. Of Social Services v. SUCEC, 924 
P.2d 882 (Utah 1996). 
Moreover, Kentucky has no jurisdiction over the 
collection of child support arrearages, criminal or civil, ordered 
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by a Utah Decree of Divorce and collected by the State of Utah, 
Office of Recovery Services. The district courts of Utah have 
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the collection of past 
due child support. State v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P. 2d 
960, 963 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court should have permitted Mr. Boudreaux to 
present evidence upon the issue of successful collection of child 
support pursuant to UIFSA. The trial court should have found based 
upon the sworn statements and proffered evidence of Mr. Boudreaux 
that Office of Recovery Services for the State of Utah is 
successfully collecting child support from Mr. Boudreaux. This 
Honorable Court should instruct the trial court to enter findings 
of fact supporting the conclusion that Mr. Boudreaux's child 
support is being successfully collected. The State of Utah, 
representing the State of Kentucky, presented no evidence upon the 
issues. Mr. Boudreaux's Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus should be granted and the State of Kentucky should be 
prohibited from further attempts to extradite him. 
MR. BOUDREAUX'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED 
AND HIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE GRANTED 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America provides, "No person shall be... deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
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United States of America provides, "...nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law..." 
Mr. Boudreaux asserted in his sworn petition the 
unconsitiutional restraint upon his liberty by his arrest and 
incarceration in the Sanpete County Jail by the rendition request 
of the State of Kentucky and the actions of the State of Utah. R. 
3-13. 
He was not notified of any Kentucky grand jury 
proceedings against him. R. 1-13, R. 184. He was not notified on 
any arraignment proceeding in Kentucky enabling him to appear 
before the Kentucky court. R. 1-13, R. 184, R. 111-125, R. 121. 
The warrant of the Governor of the State of Utah refers to Mr. 
Boudreaux as having taken refuge in Utah presumably in order to 
avoid prosecution of a crime in Kentucky. The statement is false. 
Mr. Boudreaux has always resided and been domociled in the State of 
Utah. R. 1-13. The State of Utah nor the State of Kentucky 
presented controverting evidence that Mr. Boudreaux was notified of 
an arraignment, or grand jury proceedings nor that Mr. Boudreaux 
had taken refuge in the State of Utah. 
The State of Kentucky claims in their criminal proceeding 
that Mr. Boudreaux is a fugitive and that he failed to appear for 
an arraignment before that court. Warrant of Arrest, Exhibit 5, 
p.7. The warrant asserts that Mr. Boudreaux may give no bail or 
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bond. Exhibit 5, p. 7. The failure by the State of Kentucky to 
notify Mr. Boudreaux of an arraignment proceeding, and the issuance 
of a no bail warrant for his arrest based upon his failure to 
appear and the arraignment, and his arrest upon such a warrant, is 
a violation of his rights of due process guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America. Mr. Boudreaux was arrested in Sanpete 
County on August 24, 1998, and today remains deprived of his 
liberty in the Sanpete County Jail. 
Another basis by which the State of Kentucky has 
unconstitutionally deprived Mr. Boudreaux of his liberty and right 
of due process are the affidavits of Mr. Thomas Simpson and Mr. 
Joel Rich which state false facts. R. 1-46. When there is fraud, 
falsity, bad faith, clear default, or abuse in the performance of 
a duty a court should interfere in the manner in which an executive 
authority performs it's duties prescribed by law. Cope v. Toronto, 
332 P.2d 977 (Utah 1958). Habeas corpus is used to protect anyone, 
including Mr. Boudreaux, who is restrained of his liberty where 
there exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirement 
of the law have been so ignored or distorted that the party is 
substantially and effectively denied what is included in the term 
due process of law, or where some other circumstance exists which 
would make it wholly unconscionable not to consider the matter. 
Bryant v. Turner, 431 P.2d 121 (Utah 1967); Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 
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873 (Utah 1990); Galleaos v. Turner, 409 P.2d 386 (Utah 1965). The 
statement of false facts in conclusoryf unsupported affidavits 
which to not meet the minimum requirements for affidavits made upon 
personal knowledge (the affidavits contain no attestations of 
personal knowledge and are clearly hearsay) in the State of Utah, 
deprives Mr. Boudreaux of his constitutional rights of due process. 
The State of Kentucky chose not to give Mr. Boudreaux 
notification of it's arraignment hearing and then, based upon his 
failure to appear for that arraignment issue a warrant for his 
arrest which prohibits bail because he failed to appear. Exhibit 5. 
R. 238, Tr. p. 22. The State of Kentucky chose to support it's 
request for rendition of Mr. Boudreaux by the conclusory and 
evidentiarily insufficient, unsupported affidavits stating false 
facts of it's public officials Mr. Thomas Simpson and Mr. Joel 
Rich. The State of Kentucky is bound by the affidavits when it 
supports an extradition request by them. The affidavits state false 
facts, as they did in the two (2), prior extradition attempts. The 
State of Kentucky has violated the constutionally guaranteed rights 
of due process and liberty which should be enjoyed by Mr. 
Boudreaux. 
The State of Utah and the State of Kentucky presented no 
evidence that the affidavits of Kentucky's public officials, Mr. 
Simpson and Mr. Rich, were supported and not false. 
Mr. Boudreaux has been restrained from his liberty by 
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incarceration in the Sanpete County Jail upon the unlawful 
insistance of the State of Kentucky and the State of Utah since 
August, 1998. He remains incarcerated today, the trial court 
having denied him bail, or release from incarceration. This 
Honorable Court should immediately and summarily grant Mr. 
Boudreaux's petition for writ of habeas corpus and instruct the 
trial court to release Mr. Boudreaux from jail. 
MR. BOUDREAUX SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM 
INCARCERATION OR ADMITTED TO BAIL 
On December 7, 1998, Mr. Boudreaux requested that the 
trial court release him from incarceration in the Sanpete County 
Jail, or otherwise admit him to bail. R. 238, Tr. pp. 21-41. The 
trial court denied Mr. Boudreaux's release from incarceration in 
the Sanpete County Jail, and denied his request for bail. R.238, 
Tr. pp. 39-41. 
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America provides, "Excessive bail shall not be 
required..." 
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of Utah 
provides, "(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: ...(c) except persons charged with any other crime,... if 
there is substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would 
47 
constitute a substantial danger to any other person or to the 
community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if 
released on bail." 
UIFSA, U.C.A. Section 78-45f-801(3), provides that, "(3) 
A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent with 
this chapter applies to the demand even if the individual whose 
surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state when the crime 
was allegedly committed and has not fled therefrom." The 
provisions for extradition of the Petitioner apply when they are 
not inconsistent with UIFSA. 
Mr. Boudreaux was admitted to bail after his arrest and 
incarceration in the first attempt by Kentucky to extradite him 
after the issuance of the Utah Governor's Warrant and appeared 
before the trial court at every hearing. His petition for writ of 
habeas corpus was granted. R. 1-28, R. 238, Tr. pp. 21-41. 
Mr. Boudreaux was released upon his own recognizance the 
second time he was arrested and jailed upon a warrant from Kentucky 
and after the issuance of the Utah Governor's Warrant. R. 1-28, R. 
238, Tr. pp. 21-41. 
Mr. Boudreaux poses no risk of danger to the community 
nor a substantial risk to any other person in the community. He is 
not a risk of flight. He has appeared at each hearing in each of 
the three (3), habeas corpus proceedings, including those two (2), 
prior proceeding when he was admitted to bail. The State of Utah 
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has filed no criminal information against Mr, Boudreaux. 
The trial court ruled that even though Mr. Boudreaux was 
bailable factually, the release from incarceration, and upon bail 
was prohibited by Emia v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985). R. 
238, Tr. p. 41, Tr. pp. 21-41, 36-38. 
Mr. Boudreaux is entitled to release from incarceration, 
or bail. To deprive him of release, and bail, violates the 
provisions of the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 8, the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the 
provisions of UIFSA, which provides the powers and duties of the 
trial court and the rights of Mr. Boudreaux, the State of Kentucky 
and the State of Utah. The denial of bail to Mr. Boudreaux is 
inconsistent with the rendition provision, and the powers and 
authority provisions of UIFSA. He should have been permitted bail 
pending the trial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, and 
pending the review by this Honorable Court. Mr. Boudreaux should 
be immediately released from incarceration, or admitted to bail. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Boudreaux's sworn Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
should be granted because he has been denied his constitutional 
right of due process. He should have been permitted by the trial 
court to present evidence, testimony of witnesses and documentary 
evidence. The habeas corpus remedy is res judicata because of the 
two prior grants of habeas corpus by the trial court upon identical 
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facts, Mr. Boudreaux's child support is being successfully 
collected by the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services. Mr. 
Boudreaux should be released from incarceration, or admitted to 
bail, and his petition should be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thifl^ &th d^L of April, 1999. 
^ ANDREW B. BERR>, 
Attorney for 
Larry Joe Bo;dd: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of April, 1999, I 
mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, two (2), true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Br-ie£—Qf„ Appellant to Mark E. 
Burns, Assistant Attorney General'," Attorney^'for Appellee, at 160 
East 300 South, #600, Post Office^ Box 140841, Sfclt Lake City, Utah 
84114. 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Order 
B. Notice of Appeal 
C. Utah Decree of Divorce, dated April 14, 1982 
D. Findings of Fact and Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, March 4, 1994 
E. Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, March 6, 1995 
F. U.C.A. 78-45f-100 et seq., UIFSA 
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM #03 57 
Sanpete County Attorney QfbJUTV^ 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435) 835-6381 
Facsimile: (435)835-6383 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 980600302 
I Assigned Judge: David L. Mower 
The Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
having come before the Court for hearing on October 30,1998. The Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux 
was personally present in Court and represented by his attorney, Andrew W. Berry, Jr.. The 
Respondent was represented by Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having 
examined the documents submitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties and having heard oral 
arguments thereon, now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - Boudreaux - 980600302 - Page 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1) On August 5,1998, Governor Paul E. Patten of the State of Kentucky executed a demand 
to the Governor of Utah to surrender to Kentucky Larry Joe Boudreaux a.k.a. Larry Boudreaux, 
Larry J. Boudreaux and Larry Joe Bordreaux alleging that the person to be surrendered had 
committed the crime of flagrant non-support, committed while outside the State of Kentucky which 
resulted in the commission of a crime within the State of Kentucky. 
2) Governor Patten also sent with the extradition demand an Indictment dated June 5*, 1996, 
charging Larry Boudreaux in Webster County, Kentucky with Flagrant Non-Support, a Class D 
Felony and a Warrant of Arrest for Larry Boudreaux dated January 15, 1997. Governor Patten 
certified these two documents to be authentic in accordance with the laws of the State of Kentucky, 
as well as all other documents submitted in aid of the demand. 
3) That Paul E. Patten is the Governor of the State of Kentucky and the executive authority 
of the State of Kentucky. 
4) On August 24, 1998, as a result of the demand from Kentucky Governor Patten, 
Governor Michael O. Leavitt of the State of Utah issued his Governor's Warrant for Larry Joe 
Boudreaux, a.k.a. Larry Boudreaux, Larry J. Boudreaux, Larry Joe Bordreaux . 
5) On the 31*, day of August, 1998, Police Officers from Mt. Pleasant Citv Police 
Department arrested the Petitioner based on Governor Leavitt's Warrant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - Boudreau^ - 980600302 - Page 3 
6) That the person arrested and in Court on the date of this hearing is one and the same 
Lany Joe Boudreaux demanded by the State of Kentucky. 
7) The documents submitted by Kentucky and Governor Leavitt's Warrant all appear on 
their face to be in order. The phrase in Governor Leavitt's Warrant that the accused has "taken 
refuge in the State of Utah" is not a reference to the accused being a fugitive from the State of 
Kentucky but a reference to him being present in the State of Utah. 
8) The Petitioner did not have notice of the Grand Jury proceedings in Kentucky. 
9) The Petitioner did not receive notice of arraignment proceedings in Kentucky. 
10) Petitioner is charged with a crime under the laws of the demanding State, to wit: 
Kentucky, and a charging document has been issued. 
11) The State of Kentucky is seeking the Petitioner as a person who has committed an act 
in the State of Utah which results in a crime in the State of Kentucky even though the Petitioner was 
not in the State of Kentucky at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom. 
12) The State of Kentucky has made a prior attempt to extradite Mr. Boudreaux and that 
the Governor of Utah has issued two prior Governor's Warrants for Mr. Boudreaux. A different 
issue is present in the present case from the prior attempt to extradite Mr. Boudreaux and that is 
whether or not the Petitioner may be surrendered as a non fugitive. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - Boudreaux - 980600302 • Page 4 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1) The demand made by the State of Kentucky for the Petitioner as a non-fugitive is legally 
sufficient and authorized under §77-30-6, Utah Code Annotated. 
2) The requirements of §77-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, for the extradition of the Petitioner 
have been satisfied. 
3) Res judicata is not a bar to the present proceedings. 
4) The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be 
granted. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
£\Mi^ 
DAVfff L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the petitioner's attorney, Andrew W. 
Berry, Jr. at P.O. Box 600, Moroni, Utah 84646, postage prepaid this 4^day of November, 1998. 
\^ Secretary!' 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Sanpete County Courthouse 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435) 835-6381 
Facsimile: (435)835-6383 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent. ] 
) JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
Case No. 980600302 
I Assigned Judge: David L. Mower 
The Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
having come before the Court for hearing on October 30,1998. The Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux 
was personally present in Court and represented by his attorney, Andrew W. Berry, Jr.. The 
Respondent was represented by Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT ORDERS, JUDGES AND DECREES that the 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted. 
&1ktor\ 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER - Boudreaux - 980600302 - Page 2 
The Petitioner shall be remanded to the custody of duly authorized agents from the State of 
Kentucky. 
DATED this ' 3 day of November, 1998. 
BY THE COURT; 
l-\Mt K 
DAVID L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER to the petitioner's attorney, Andrew W. Berry, Jr. at P.O. Box 600, 
Moroni, Utah 84646, postage prepaid thisj^day of November, 1998. 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. USB #0309 
Attorney for Larry Joe Boudreaux 
62 West Main Street 
Post Office Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 801 436-8200 
OMM^ 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case Number 980600302 
Assigned to: 
Honorable David L. Mower 
ooOoo 
The Petitioner, LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, hereby appeals to 
the Utah Supreme Court the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order of the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County 
within the State of Utah entered on the ^>o day of November, 
1998, the Honorable David L. Mower, presiding. 
DATED this ^ S day o(f Novembej 
ANDREW B. BERRY? 
Attorney for Larry Jtoe Boudreaux 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this of November, 
1998, I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid and by first class 
mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, to 
Mr. Ross C. Blackham, the Sanpete County Attorney, at the Sanpete 
County Courthouse, 160 North Main Street, Manti, Utah 84642, and to 
the Jan Graham, the Utah Attorney Gen^ jgai, and^er deputy Christine 
Soltis, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt LakeSpity, Utah 84114. 
^ n O ' v - U ..: I- DEFENDANT'S 
I r EXHIBIT If £__ 
DOUGLAS F . WHITE «g^ Apr ]/\ ft|| -.A'JU 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Prudential Plaza 
165 North Main, Suite B-l 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Telephone: 882-2272 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 81-0772 
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HELANIE LYNN BOUDREAUX, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This natter having come on regularly on the 22nd day of 
March, 1982, before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge, 
the plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by his 
counsel, Douglas F. White, Esquire, and the defendant having 
duly executed her Appearance and Waiver, and the Court having 
entered the default of the defendant herein, and the Court 
having received evidence, including the testimony of the 
I plaintiff, and the case having been submitted to the Court for 
its determination and decision and more than ninety (90) days 
having elapsed since the filing of said Complaint, and the Court, 
having inquired into the legal sufficiency of fctTe-.evidence so 
adduced, NOW THEREFORE, and upon motion of plaintiff Is -counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded.a 
Decree of Divorce from the defendant, upon the grounds'tft mental 
cruelty and that the marriage between plaintiff and dej.enuauu-j.6 k 
This matter having come on regularly on the 22nd day of 
March, 1982, before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge, 
the plaintiff appearing in person and being represented by his 
counsel, Douglas F. White, Esquire, and the defendant having 
duly executed her Appearance and Waiver, and the Court having 
II entered the default of the defendant herein, and the Court 
I having received evidence, including the testimony of the 
I plaintiff, and the case having been submitted to the Court for 
its determination and decision and more than ninety (90) days 
having elapsed since the filing of said Complaint, and the Court 
having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so 
adduced, NOW THEREFORE, and upon motion of plaintiff's counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded a 
Decree of Divorce from the defendant, upon the grounds of mental 
cruelty and that the marriage between plaintiff and ueienuaul is 
hereby dissolved.and the parties are hereby freed and absolutely 
released from the bonds of matrimony and all of the obligations 
thereof, provided that this Decree shall not become final and 
absolute until the expiration of three (3) months from its 
entry, at which time this Decree shall become final and 
absolute without any further or other action of the parties. 
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2. Awarding the care, custody and control of the minor 
child of the parties to defendant, who as her mother is a 
fit and proper person to have said custody, care and control 
awarded to her, subject to plaintiff's right of visitation at 
all reasonable times and places. 
3. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant as and 
for support ot tne minor child the sum of $200.00 per month. 
4. That during the marriage of the parties defendant has 
treated plaintiff cruelly causing him great mental distress and 
suffering until he is unable to continue the marriage j 
! 
relationship, to-wit: the parties fought and argued continually 
i 
to the point that they were unable to continue the marriage | 
relationship. 
5. Ordering plaintiff to assume and pay the debts and 
obligations of the parties incurred to the time of separation. 
6. Ordering plaintiff to maintain health and accident 
insurance for the benefit of the parties1 minor child, where 
available at his place of employment. 
7. Ordering plaintiff to obtain a policy of life insurance 
at 510,000.00 on his person and make the minor child of the 
parties the beneficiary thereof. 
8. Ordering the plaintiff to pay for all attorney's fees 
and costs of court incurred in this action for himself and the 
defendant. 
9. Awarding plaintiff and defendant as their sole and 
separate property that property which they now have in their 
possession, whatever it might be. 
DATED this / 7 day ot April, 1982. 
to the point that they were unable to <—.itinue the marriage 
relationship. 
I 
5. Ordering plaintiff to assume and pay the debts and 
obligations of the parties incurred to the time of separation. 
6. Ordering plaintiff to maintain health and accident 
insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor childf where 
available at his place of employment. 
7. Ordering plaintiff to obtain a policy of life insurance 
at $10,000.00 on his person and make the minor child of the 
parties the beneficiary thereof. 
8. Ordering the plaintiff to pay for all attorney's fees 
and costs of court incurred in this action for himself and the 
defendant. 
9. Awarding plaintiff and defendant as their sole and 
separate property that property which they now have in their 
possession, whatever it might be. 
DATED this / J day of April, 1982. 
n 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309 
Attorney for Petitioner 
62 West Mam Street 
P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 801 436-8200 
III THE SIXTH JUCICIAL DISTRICT; COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
coOoo 
LARRY JOE 30UEREAUX, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 9316C0149 
Assigned to: 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for a regularly scheduled evidentiary 
hearing upon the Petition of Larry J, Boudreaux for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus on the 2nd day of February, 1994, before the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court Judge. The 
Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, was present and represented by his 
counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., ana the State of Utah was present 
and represented by itf s counsel, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County 
Attorney. The parties presented the testimony of witnesses. THE 
COURT, upon the testimony of the witnesses, the stipulation of the 
parties, the pleadings on file herein and good cause appearing 
therefore, hereby makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On the 16th day December, 1993, the State of Kentucky 
submitted it's application fir a Governor's Warrant to :ht State of 
« 
Utah. 
2. On the 17th day of December, 1993, the Governor of 
the State of Utah, Michael O. Leavitt, issued his warrant for the 
arrest of the Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux. 
3. The Governor's Warrant asserts thar the Petitioner 
stands charged v/ith the crime of Flagrant Nonsupport and asserts 
that the Petitioner committed said crime in the County of Sanpete 
within the State of Kentucky. 
4. The Governor's Warrant: asserts thar tne Petitioner 
fled from the justice of the State of Kentucky and has taken refuge 
in the State of Utah. 
5. The Petitioner did not flee the State of Kentucky. 
6. The Petitioner is not a fugitive from justice. 
7. The Governor's Warrant issued by the Governor Michael 
0. Leavitt of the State of Utah is defective. 
3. Each of the affidavits upon which the Governor's 
Warrant was issued are defective and false and the facts stated in 
said affidavits are not true. 
9. The Department of Human Services, Office of Recovery 
Services for the State of Utah and their counterpart in the State 
of Nevada have been collecting child support from the Petitioner 
through their URESA actions now pending. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus presented by 
the Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, should be granted and the 
Governer's Warrant for the arrest of the Petitioner is defective 
upon it's face and void and should be denied ana quashed; and 
2. URESA actions by the State of Utah and the State of 
Nevada have been successful in collecting child support from the 
Petitoner. 
3. The Petitioner did not flee the State of Kentucky. 
4. The Petitioner is not a fugitive from justice. 
5. The Governor's Warrant issued by the Governor Michael 
0. Leavitt of the State of Utah is defective and void and should be 
quashed. 
6. Each of the affidavits upon which tne Governor's 
Warrant was issued are defective and false and the facts stated in 
said affidavits are not true. 
7. The Information filed by the State of Utah, case 
number, 931600149, alleging that the Petitioner is a fugitive from 
justice should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED th i.j£ day of March, 1994 
-BY-THE--GOXJRT: 
HONORABLE DD&^J. TIBB3, 
Sixth Judircfia 1 District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /stJJ day of March, 1994, 
I served upon and mailed, postage prepaid ana by first class mail, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to Mr.^RCTss C~. "&fc^ ckham, the Sanpete County 
Attorney, at the Sanpete cd^nty Courthouse, 160 North Main Street, 
Manti, Utah 84642. 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309 
Attorney for Petitioner 
62 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 801 436-82CK) C / - : a \ ^ 
III THE SIXTH JUCICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LARRY JOE BCUDREAUX, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondant. 
ORDER UPON THE 
PETITION FOR URIT 
OF HAEEAS CORF US 
Case No. 931600149 
Assigned to: 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for a regularly scheduled evidentiary 
hearing upon the Petition of Larry J. Boudreaux for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus on the 2nd day of February, 1994, before the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court Judge. The 
Petitioner, Larry Joe Boudreaux, was present and represented by his 
counsel, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and the State of Utah was present 
and represented by it's counsel, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County 
Attorney. The parties presented the testimony of witnesses. THE 
COURT, upon the testimony of the witnesses, the stipulation of the 
parties, the pleadings on file herein and good cause appearing 
therefore, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus presented by 
the Petitioner, Larry Joe Bcudreaux, is granted and the Governer's 
•~)t. 
the Petitioner is denied and quashed; and 
the Petitioner is a fugitive from 
warrant for the arrest of 
fiiPd bv the State of Utah, case 2. The information filed oy 
number, 931600149, alleging that 
justice is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this _^__ day of March, 1994 
BY THE"COURT: 
HONORABLE W ^ T l W , 
-Sixth Judicial District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND HAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 
1
 served ^ ^ ^ . ? % £ £ % & 
a true and correct copy 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
County Attorney, at the 
Street, Manti, Utah 8464 
day of Karch, 1994, 
a.i-'by first class mail, 
Order Upon the Petition 
Blackham, the Sanpete 
thouse, 160 North Main 
T7 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR. 0309 
Attorney for Defendant 
62 West Main Street 
Post Office Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
Telephone: 801 436-8200 
FILER 
SANPET€ COUNTY. UTAH 
*95flHR 6 m I 26 
KW5T1NE FV^RiSTIANSEN 
CLERK 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LARRY JOE BOUDREAUX, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondant. 
ORDER UPON PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Case No. 931600149 
(consolidated tfith 
case nos. 9406D0636 
9406D0581 
941630173 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for^  a regularly scheduled hearing 
upon the Petition for Writ of Habeas * Corpus of Larry Jce Boudreaux 
on the 16th day of November, 1994, before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, Sixth Judicial District Court Judge. The Petitioner, Larry 
Joe Boudreaux, was present and represented by his counsel, Andrew 
B. Berry, Jr., and the State of Utah was present and represented by 
it's counsel, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The 
parties entered into stipulations upon the record. THE COURT, upon 
the stipulations of the parties, the pleadings on file herein and 
good cause appearing therefore, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The stipulation of the parties is approved and 
adopted by the Court; 
2. The Petitioner is the Larry Joe Boudrea ix named in 
the Governor's Warrant dated the 31st day of March, 19 94, and the 
State of Kentucky initially claimed approximately rwenty-four 
Thousand Dollars ($24,000.00), in child support arrearages. The 
Petitioner has paid another Four Thousand Six Hundred Dollars 
($4,600.00), which has been collected by the State of Utah since 
the last evidentiary hearing upon this matter and durinc the period 
from February, 1994, through November 16, 1994; 
3. This action is consolidated with ccse numbers 
940600581, 941600173, and 940600636, and the case number shall 
hereafter be 931600149; 
4. This ruling is based upon the evidence presented and 
the Court's prior rulings in case numbers 931600149, anc 940600581, 
and the findings of fact made therein. The underlying warrant 
documents (upon which the present warrant is based), transcript and 
evidence presented in those proceedings have been consolidated 
herein; 
5. The previously entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order Upon Petition for Writ of Habeas C >rpus shall 
stand and remain in effect and said findings, cone usions and 
orders are incorporated as though fully set forth herem; 
6. The trial court reserves the right to determine the 
amount to award the Petitioner for his damages, costs and attorney-
fees incurred by him in these proceedings which have been 
consolidated following the appeal- which the State of Utah asserts 
it will take from this order; and 
7. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Larry Joe 
Boudreaux is granted. The Governor's Warrant and tie Criminal 
Information issued by the State of Utah thereupon is again quashed, 
denied and dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this £~~~ day of March, 1995. 
3ccr 
District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 
I 
day of March, 1995, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Upon 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, postage prepaid, and by First 
Class Mail, to Ross C. Blackham, Sarjp^ e^ CourTty^ttorne^ , 160 North 
Main Street, Manti, Utah, 84642* 
tfl 
JUDICIAL CODE 78-45e-4 
04. Priority o n court calendar. 
* ^ the request of a party to a custody proceeding which 
I P°°
 flUestion of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under 
**^lf the case shall be given calendar priority and handled 
«5. Notices — Orders to appear — Manner of 
**
-p
^ service. 
, Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty upon the 
to notify a party or court of a particular fact or action, 
^notification may be accomplished by the clerk of the court 
oarty to the action upon order of the court. 
*'» Orders of the court for parties or persons to appear 
;"- the court in accordance with the terms of this act shall 
**ude te^ m<^ s u ® c * e n t service of process in accordance 
^ the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise 
tiered for good cause shown. i960 
^45c-26. Short t it le . 
ftus act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child Custody 
• A c t i o n Act." 1980 
CHAPTER 45d 
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION [REPEALED] 
TH5d-l to 78-45d-13. Repealed. 1988 
CHAPTER 46e 
VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF PATERNITY 
#ctoon 
M5e-1. Chapter title. 
M5e-2. Voluntary declaration of paternity. 
M5e-3. Requirements for filing. 
M5e-4. Rescission of the declaration. 
M5e-1. Chapter t it le. 
This act is known as the "Voluntary Declaration of Paternity 
<t" 1994 
M5e-2. Voluntary declarat ion of paternity. 
< 1) (a) A voluntary declaration of paternity filed in compli-
ance with this chapter establishes a father-child relation-
ship identical to the relationship established when a child 
is born to persons married to each other. 
(b) When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed, 
the liabilities of the father include, but are not limited to, 
the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and 
confinement and for the education, necessary support, 
and any funeral expenses for the child. 
(c) When a father voluntarily declares paternity, his 
liability for past amounts due is limited to a period of four 
years immediately preceding the date that the voluntary 
declaration of paternity was filed. 
' J When a voluntary declaration of paternity is filed it 
' ^  recognized as a basis for a child support order without 
**? father requirement or proceeding regarding the estab-
^ e n t of paternity. 
, \ voluntary declaration of paternity may be com-
**** and signed any time after the birth of the child. A 
untary declaration of paternity may not be executed or filed 
c o n s e n t to or relinquishment for adoption has been 
The voluntary declaration of paternity shall become an 
r*rufi n t t o ^ ^S"11*1 b i r t h certificate. The original 
^ t i n 0 ^ an<^ *ke declaration snau< ^ marked so as to be 
• u i ^ ? 1 1 8 ^ ^ ' ' r n e declaration may be included as part of 
^ jequently issued certified copies of the birth certificate. 
atively, electronically issued copies of a certificate may 
reflect the amended information and the date of amendment 
only. 
(5) The voluntary declaration of paternity shall be in the 
form prescribed by the state registrar of vital statistics and 
shall be accompanied with an explanation of the alternatives 
to, the legal consequences of, and the rights and responsibili-
ties that arise from signing the declaration. 
(6) The social security number of any person who is subject 
to a voluntary declaration of paternity shall be placed in the 
records relating to the matter. 1997 
78-45e-3. Requirements for filing. 
A voluntary declaration of paternity may not be filed with 
the state registrar unless the declaration: 
(1) is signed by the birth mother and biological father, 
and by the legal guardian or a parent of a biological father 
who is under 18 years of age, in the presence of two 
witnesses who are not related by blood or marriage; and 
(2) the mother and alleged father have been given 
notice, orally and in writing, of the alternatives to, the 
legal consequences of, and the rights and responsibilities 
that arise from signing the declaration. 1998 
78-45e-4. Resciss ion of the declaration. 
(1) A signed voluntary declaration of paternity is a legal 
finding of paternity, subject to the right of any signatory to 
rescind the acknowledgment within the earlier of: 
(a) 60 days of signing; or 
(b) the date of an adjninistrative or judicial proceeding 
• relating to the child, including a proceeding to establish a 
support order, in which the signatory is a party. 
(2) (a) After the period referred to in Subsection (1), a 
signed voluntary declaration of paternity may be chal-
lenged in court only on the grounds of fraud, duress, or 
material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the 
challenger. 
(b) The legal responsibilities, including child support, 
of any signatory arising from the declaration may not be 
suspended during a challenge under Subsection (2)(a), 
except for good cause shown. 
(3) In determining whether to rescind the declaration the 
court has the same authority and obligation with regard to 
genetic testing as is provided in Section 78-45a-7. 
(4) A child support order based on the voluntary declaration 
of paternity remains in effect during the pendency of any 
proceeding under this section, and until a final order of the 
court rescinding the voluntary declaration. 
(5) If the declaration is rescinded, the declarant father may 
not recover any child support he provided for the child before 
entry of the order of rescission. 1997 
CHAPTER 46f 
UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT 
Par t i 
General Provisions 
Section 
78-45f-100. Title. 
78-45f-101. Definitions. 
78-45f-102. Tribunal of state. 
78-45f-103. Remedies cumulative. 
Part 2 
Jurisdiction 
78-45f-201. Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident. 
78-45f-202. Procedure when exercising jurisdiction over 
nonresident. 
78-45M00 JUDICIAL CODE 
Section 
78-45f-203. Initiating and responding tribunal of state. 
78-45f-204. Simultaneous proceedings in another state. 
78-45f-205. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
78-45f-206. Enforcement and modification of support order 
by tribunal having continuing jurisdiction. 
78-45f-207. Recognition of controlling child support order. 
78-45f-208. Multiple child support orders for two or more 
obligees. 
78-45f-209. Credit for payments. 
Part 3 
Civil Provisions of General Application 
78-45f-301. Proceedings under chapter. 
78-45f-302. Action by minor parent. 
78-45f-303. Application of law of state. 
78-45f-304. Duties of initiating tribunal. 
78-45f-305. Duties and powers of responding tribunal. 
78-45f-306. Inappropriate tribunal. 
78-45f-307. Duties of support enforcement agency. 
78-45f-308. Duty of attorney general. 
78-45f-309. Private counsel. 
78-45f-310. Duties of state information agency. 
78-45f-311. Pleadings and accompanying documents. 
78-45f-312. Nondisclosure of information in exceptional 
circumstances. 
78-45f-313. Costs and fees. 
78-45f-314. Limited immunity of petitioner. 
78-45f-315. Nonparentage as defense. 
78-45f-316. Special rules of evidence and procedure. 
78-45f-317. Communications between tribunals. 
78-45f-318. Assistance with discovery. 
78-45f-319. Receipt and disbursement of payments. 
Part 4 
Establishment of Support Order 
78-45f-401. Petition to establish support order. 
Parts 
Enforcement of Order of Another State Without 
Registration 
78-45f-501. Employer's receipt of income-withholding or-
der of another state. 
78-45f-502. Employer's compliance with income withhold-
ing of another state. 
78-45f-503. Compliance with multiple income withholding 
orders. 
78-45f-504. Immunity from civil liability. 
78-45f-505. Penalties for noncompliance. 
78-45f-506. Contest by obligor. 
78-45f-507. Administrative enforcement of orders. 
Part 6 
Enforcement and Modification of Support Order After 
Registration 
78-45f-601. Registration of order for enforcement. 
78-45f-602. Procedure to register order for enforcement. 
78-45f-603. Effect of registration for enforcement. 
78-45f-604. Choice of law. 
78-45f-605. Notice of registration of order. 
78-45f-606. Procedure to contest validity or enforcement of 
registered order. 
78-45f-607. Contest of registration or enforcement. 
78-45f-608. Confirmed order. 
Section 
78-45f-609. 
78-45f-610. 
78-45f-611. 
78-45f-612. 
78-45f-613. 
78-45f-614. 
78-45f-701. 
78-45f-801. 
78-45f-802. 
78-45f-901. 
Procedure to register child support d*^ 
another state for modification. ' ^ A J V * 
Effect of registration for modification^liu 
Modification of child support order of ajv-
state. ^ 
Recognition of order modified in another ^ 
Jurisdiction to modify child support o^ u^ 
another state when individual parties jS 
in this state. f ^ ^ 
Notice to issuing tribunal of modification h 
Part 7 
Determination of Parentage 
Proceeding to determine parentage. 
Part 8 
Interstate Rendition 
Grounds for rendition. 
Conditions of rendition. 
Part 9 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
Uniformity of application and construction 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
78-45M00. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Interstaf -> Family 
Support Act." 
78-45M01. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Child" means an individual, whether over or under 
the age of majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty 
of support by the individual's parent or who is or is alleged 
to be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the 
parent. 
(2) "Child support order* means a support order for a 
child, including a child who has attained the age of 
majority under the law of the issuing state. 
(3) "Duty of support" means an obligation imposed or 
imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse, or 
former spouse, including an unsatisfied obligation to 
provide support. 
(4) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived 
with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six 
consecutive months immediately preceding the time of 
filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and, 
if a child is less than six months old, the state in which the 
child lived from birth with any of them. A period of 
temporary absence of any of them is counted as part of the 
six-month or other period. 
(5) "Income" includes earnings or other periodic entitle-
ments to money from any source and any other property 
subject to withholding for support under the law of this 
state. 
(6) "Income-withholding order" means an order or no-
tice directed to an obligor's employer directing the em-
ployer to withhold support from the income of the obligoi 
in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4 or Part 5 
(7) "Initiating state" means a state from which a pro-
ceeding is forwarded or in which a proceeding is filed for 
forwarding to a responding state under this chapter or a 
law or procedure substantially similar to this chapter, the 
633 
JUDICIAL CODE 78-45f-204 
• form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the 
o Msed Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
A) "Initiating tribunal" means the authorized tribunal 
an initiating state. 
(9) "Issuing state" means the state in which a tribunal 
- ues a support order or renders a judgment determining 
parentage. 
(10) "Issuing tr ibunal" means the tr ibunal tha t issues a 
.upport order or renders a judgment determining parent-
(11) "Law" includes decisional and statutory law and 
rules and regulations having the force of law. 
(12) "Obligee" means: 
(a) an individual to whom a duty of support is or is 
alleged to be owed or in whose favor a support order 
has been issued or a judgment determining parent-
age has been rendered; 
(b) a state or political subdivision to which the 
rights under a duty of support or support order have 
been assigned or which has independent claims based 
on financial assistance provided to an individual 
obligee; or 
(c) an individual seeking a judgment determining 
parentage of the individual's child. 
(13) "Obligor" means an individual, or the estate of a 
decedent who: 
(a) owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support; 
(b) is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a 
parent of a child; or 
(c) is liable under a support order. 
(14) "Register" means to file a support order or judg-
ment deterniining parentage in the district court. 
(15) "Registering tr ibunal" means a tribunal in which a 
support order is registered. 
(16) "Responding state" means a state in which a 
proceeding is filed or to which a proceeding is forwarded 
for filing from an initiating state under this chapter or a 
law or procedure substantially similar to this chapter, the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the 
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
(17) "Responding tribunal" means the authorized tribu-
nal in a responding state. 
(18) "Spousal-support order" means a support order for 
a spouse or former spouse of the obligor. 
(19) "State" means a state of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States 
Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term 
includes an Indian tribe and a foreign jurisdiction tha t 
has enacted a law or established procedures for issuance 
and enforcement of support orders which are substan-
tially similar to the procedures under this chapter. 
(20) "Support enforcement agency" means a public of-
ficial or agency authorized to seek: 
(a) enforcement of support orders or laws relating 
to the duty of support; 
(b) establishment or modification of child support; 
(c) determination of parentage; or 
(d) to locate obligors or their assets. 
(21) "Support order" means a judgment, decree, or 
order, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, 
for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, 
which provides for monetary support, health care, 
arrearages, or reimbursement, and may include related 
costs and fees, interest, income withholding, attorney's 
fees, and other relief. 
(22) "Tribunal" means a court, administrative agency, 
or quasi-judicial entity a u t h o r e d to establish, enforce, or 
modify support orders or to determine parentage. 1997 
78-45M02. Tribunal of s tate . 
The district court and the Department of Human Services 
are the tribunals of this state. 1997 
78-45M03. Remedies cumulat ive . 
Remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do 
not affect the availability of remedies under other law. 1997 
PART 2 
JURISDICTION 
78-45f-201. Bases for jurisdict ion over nonres ident . 
In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support 
order or to determine parentage, a tribunal of this state may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, or 
the individual's guardian or conservator, if: 
(1) the individual is personally served with notice 
within this state; 
(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this 
state by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by 
filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving 
any contest to personal jurisdiction; 
(3) the individual resided with the child in this state; 
(4) the individual resided in this state and provided 
prenatal expenses or support for the child; 
(5) the child resides in this state as a result of the acts 
or directives of the individual; 
(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this 
state and the child may have been conceived by tha t act of 
intercourse; 
(7) the individual asserted parentage in the putative 
father registry maintained in this state by the state 
registrar of vital records in the Department of Health 
pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption; or 
(8) there is any other basis consistent with the consti-
tutions of this s tate and the United States for the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction. 1997 
78-45f-202. Procedure w h e n exercis ing jur isdict ion 
over nonres ident . 
A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over 
a nonresident under Section 78-45f-201 may apply Section 
78-45f-316 to receive evidence from another state, and Section 
78-45-318 to obtain discovery through a tribunal of another 
state. In all other respects, Par t s 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not apply 
and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive 
law of this state, including the rules on choice of law other 
than those established by this chapter. 1997 
78-45f-203. Init iat ing and responding tribunal of s tate . 
Under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an 
initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to another state and 
as a responding tribunal for proceedings initiated in another 
state. 1997 
78-45f-204. Simultaneous proceedings in another 
state. 
( D A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to 
establish a support order if the petition is filed after a petition 
or comparable pleading is filed in another state only: 
(a) if the petition in this state is filed before the 
expiration of the time allowed in the other state for filing 
a responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the other state; 
(b) if the contesting party timely challenges the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in the other state; and 
(c) if relevant, this s tate is the home state of the child. 
(2) A tribunal of this s tate may not exercise jurisdiction to 
establish a support order if the petition is filed before a 
petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state: 
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(a) if the petition or comparable pleading in the other 
state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in 
this state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the 
exercise of jurisdiction by this state; 
(b) if the contesting party timely challenges the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in this state; and 
(c) if relevant, the other state is the home state of the 
child. 1997 
78-45f-205. Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
(1) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consis-
tent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction over a child support order: 
(a) as long as this state remains the residence of the 
obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose 
benefit the support order is issued; or 
(b) until all of the parties who are individuals have 
filed written consents with the tribunal of this state for a 
tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
(2) A tribunal of this state issuing a child support order 
consistent with the law of this state may not exercise its 
continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order has 
been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to a law 
substantially similar to this chapter. 
(3) If a child support order of this state is modified by a 
tribunal of another state pursuant to a law substantially 
similar to this chapter, a tribunal of this state loses its 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction with regard to prospective 
enforcement of the order issued in this state, and may only: 
(a) enforce the order that was modified as to amounts 
accruing before the modification; 
(b) enforce nonmodifiable aspects of that order; and 
(c) provide other appropriate relief for violations of that 
order which occurred before the effective date of the 
modification. 
(4) A tribunal of this state shall recognize the continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which has 
issued a child support order pursuant to a law substantially 
similar to this chapter. 
(5) A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending 
resolution of a jurisdictional conflict does not create continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal. 
(6) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consis-
tent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout the 
existence of the support obligation. A tribunal of this state 
may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of 
another state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over 
that order under the law of that state. 1997 
78-45f-206. Enforcement and modification of support 
order by tribunal having continuing jurisdic-
tion. 
(1) A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating 
tribunal to request a tribunal of another state to enforce or 
modify a support order issued in that state. 
(2) A tribunal of this state having continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction over a support order may act as a responding 
tribunal to enforce or modify the order. If a party subject to the 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal no longer 
resides in the issuing state, in subsequent proceedings the 
tribunal may apply Section 78-45f-316 to receive evidence 
from another state and Section 78-45f-318 to obtain discovery 
through a tribunal of another state. 
(3) A tribunal of this state which lacks continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction over a spousal support order may not serve as a 
responding tribunal to modify a spousal support order of 
another state. 1997 
78-45f-207. Recognition of controlling child support 
order. 
(1) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter and onlj 
one tribunal has issued a child support order, the order of that 
tribunal controls and must be so recognized. 
(2) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and two 01 
more child support orders have been issued by tribunals <tf 
this state or another state with regard to the same obligor and 
child, a tribunal of this state shall apply the following rules in 
determining which order to recognize for purposes of continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction: 
(a) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing" 
exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that 
tribunal controls and must be so recognized. 
(b) If more than one of the tribunals would have 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, an 
order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the 
child controls and must be so recognized, but if an order 
has not been issued in the current home state of the child, 
the order most recently issued controls and must be so 
recognized. 
(c) If none of the tribunals would have continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the tribunal of 
this state having jurisdiction over the parties shall issue 
a child support order, which controls and must be so 
recognized. 
(3) If two or more child support orders have been issued for 
the same obligor and child and if the obligor or the individual 
obligee resides in this state, a party may request a tribunal oi 
this state to determine which order controls and must be so 
recognized under Subsection (2). The request must be accom-
panied by a certified copy of every support order in effect. The 
requesting party shall give notice of the request to each party 
whose rights may be affected by the determination. 
(4) The tribunal that issued the controlling order under 
Subsection (1), (2), or (3) is the tribunal that has continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction under Section 78-45f-205. 
(5) A tribunal of this state which determines by order the 
identity of the controlling order under Subsection (2)(a) or (b) 
or which issues a new controlling order under Subsection (2)(c) 
shall state in that order the basis upon which the tribunal 
made its determination. 
(6) Within 30 days after issuance of an order determining 
the identity of the controlling order, the party obtaining the 
order shall file a certified copy of it with each tribunal that 
issued or registered an earlier order of child support. A part}/ 
who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is subject 
to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue oi 
failure to file arises. The failure to file does not affect the 
validity or enforceability of the controlling order. 1997 
78-45f-208. Multiple child support orders for two or 
more obligees. 
In responding to multiple registrations or petitions fox 
enforcement of two or more child support orders in effect at 
the same time with regard to the same obligor and different 
individual obligees, at least one of which was issued by a 
tribunal of another state, a tribunal of this state shall enforce 
those orders in the same manner as if the multiple orders had 
been issued by a tribunal of this state. IWI 
78-45f-209. Credit for payments. 
Amounts collected and credited for a particular period 
pursuant to a support order issued by a tribunal of anothei 
state must be credited against the amounts accruing 01 
accrued for the same period under a support order issued bj 
the tribunal of this state. 199*3 
PART 3 
CIVIL PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICATION 
7g45f-301. Proceedings under chapter. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, this part 
0 j j e s to all proceedings under this chapter. 
(2) T^s c n a P t e r provides for the following proceedings: 
(a) establishment of an order for spousal support or 
child support pursuant to Par t 4; 
(b) enforcement of a support order and income-with-
holding order of another state without registration pur-
suant to Part 5; 
(c) registration of an order for spousal support or child 
support of another state for enforcement pursuant to Par t 
6; 
(d) modification of an order for child support or spousal 
support issued by a tribunal of this state pursuant to 
Sections 78-45f-203, 78-45f-204, 78-45f-205, and 78-45f-
206; 
(e) registration of an order for child support of another 
state for modification pursuant to Par t 6; 
(f) determination of parentage pursuant to Part 7; and 
(g) assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents pursuant 
to Sections 78-45f-201 and 78-45f-202. 
(3) An individual petitioner or a support enforcement 
agency may commence a proceeding authorized under this 
chapter by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal for 
forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a petition or a 
comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state 
which has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respon-
dent. 1W7 
78-45f-302. Act ion by minor parent . 
A minor parent, or a guardian or other legal representative 
of a minor parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or 
for the benefit of the minor's child. 1997 
78-45f-303. Appl icat ion of law of state . 
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a responding 
tribunal of this s tate shall: 
(1) apply the procedural and substantive law, including 
the rules on choice of law, generally applicable to similar 
proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all 
powers and provide all remedies available in those pro-
ceedings; and 
(2) determine the duty of support and the amount 
payable in accordance with the law and support guide-
lines of this s tate. 1997 
78-45f-304. Dut ie s of in i t iat ing tribunal. 
(1) Upon the filing of a petition authorized by this chapter, 
an initiating tr ibunal of this state shall forward three copies of 
the petition and its accompanying documents: 
(a) to the responding tribunal or appropriate support 
enforcement agency in the responding state; or 
(b) if the identity of the responding tribunal is un-
known, to the state information agency of the responding 
state with a request that they be forwarded to the 
appropriate tr ibunal and tha t receipt be acknowledged. 
(2) If a responding state has not enacted this chapter or a 
law or procedure substantially similar to this chapter, a 
tribunal of this s tate may issue a certificate or other document 
and make findings required by the law of the responding state. 
If the responding state is a foreign jurisdiction, the tribunal 
may specify the amount of support sought and provide the 
other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements of the 
responding state. 1997 
78-45f-305. Dut ie s and powers of responding tribunal* 
(1) When a responding tribunal of this state receives a 
Petition or comparable pleading from an initiating tribunal or 
directly pursuant to Subsection 78-45f-301(2)(c), it shall cause 
the petition or pleading to be filed and notify the petitioner 
where and when it was filed. 
(2) A responding tr ibunal of this state, to the extent other-
wise authorized by law, may do one or more of the following: 
(a) issue or enforce a support order, modify a child 
support order, or render a judgment to determine parent-
age; 
(b) order an obligor to comply with a support order, 
specifying the amount and the manner of compliance; 
(c) order income withholding; 
(d) determine the amount of any arrearages and 
specify a method of payment; 
(e) enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both; 
(f) set aside property for satisfaction of the support 
order; 
(g) place liens and order execution on the obligor's 
property; 
(h) order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the 
obligor's current residential address, telephone number, 
employer, address of employment, and telephone number 
a t the place of employment; 
(i) issue a bench warrant for an obligor who has failed 
after proper notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the 
tribunal and enter the bench warrant in any local and 
state computer systems for criminal warrants; 
(j) order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by 
specified methods; 
(k) award reasonable attorneys' fees and other fees and 
costs; and 
(1) grant any other available remedy. 
(3) A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a 
support order issued under this chapter, or in the documents 
accompanying the order, the calculations on which the support 
order is based. 
(4) A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the 
payment of a support order issued under this chapter upon 
compliance by a party with provisions for visitation. 
(5) If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order 
under this chapter, the tribunal shall send a copy of the order 
to the petitioner and the respondent and to the initiating 
tribunal, if any. 1997 
78-45f-306. Inappropriate tribunal. 
If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an 
inappropriate tribunal of this state, it shall forward the 
pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate 
tribunal in this state or another state and notify the petitioner 
where and when the pleading was sent. 1997 
78-45f-307. Duties of support enforcement agency. 
(1) A support enforcement agency of this state, upon re-
quest, shall provide services to a petitioner in a proceeding 
under this chapter. 
(2) A support enforcement agency that is providing services 
to the petitioner as appropriate shall: 
(a) take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate 
tribunal in this state or another state to obtain jurisdic-
tion over the respondent; 
(b) request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time, 
and place for a hearing; 
(c) make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant 
information, including information as to income and prop-
erty of the parties; 
(d) within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, 
and legal holidays, after receipt of a written notice from 
an initiating, responding, or registering tribunal, send a 
copy of the notice to the petitioner; 
(e) within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, 
and legal holidays, after receipt of a written communica-
tion from the respondent or the respondent's attorney, 
Send a copy of the communication to the petitioner; and 
(f) notify the petitioner if jurisdiction over the respon-
dent cannot be obtained. 
'*) This chapter does not create or negate a relationship of 
at torney and client or other fiduciary relationship between a 
s u PPor t enforcement agency or the attorney for the agency 
a n
" the individual being assisted by the agency. 1997 
r&L4$gtf0& Duty of attorney general. 
" % e attorney general determines t ha t the support enforce-
ment agency is neglecting or refusing to provide services to an 
m c u v i d u a l , the attorney general may order the agency to 
p e r f o ^ jf£ duties under this chapter or may provide those 
serv i C e s directly to the individual. 1997 
7 8 - 4 $ f - 3 0 9 . Pr iva te counse l . 
^7* individual may employ private counsel to represent the 
individual in proceedings authorized by this chapter. 1997 
78-4§f_3iQ# D u t i e s of s tate informat ion agency. 
d' The Office of Recovery Services is the state information 
agency under this chapter. 
'2) The state information agency shall: 
(a) compile and maintain a current list, including ad-
dresses, of the tribunals in this state which have jurisdic-
tion under this chapter and any support enforcement 
Agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state 
information agency of every other state; 
(b) maintain a register of tribunals and support en-
forcement agencies received from other states; 
(c) forward to the appropriate tribunal in the place in 
this state in which the individual obligee or the obligor 
besides, or in which the obligor's property is believed to be 
located, all documents concerning a proceeding under this 
chapter received from an initiating tjibnna) DT the state 
^formation agency of the initiating state; and 
(d) obtain information concerning the location of the 
%ligor and the obligor's property within this state not 
Exempt from execution, by such means as postal verifica-
tion and federal or state locator services, examination of 
telephone directories, requests for the obligor's address 
^om employers, and examination of governmental 
*ecords, including, to the extent not prohibited by law, 
%ose relating to real property, vital records, law enforce-
ment, taxation, motor vehicles, driver's licenses, and 
Social Security number. 1997 
Pleadings and accompanying documents. 
J^-' A petitioner seeking to establish or modify a support 
orde*
 o r to determine parentage in a proceeding under this 
c n aPter must verify the petition. Unless otherwise ordered 
u n
"
e
^ Section 78-45f-312, the petition or accompanying docu-
m®n^5 must provide, so far as known, the name, residential 
address, and Social Security numbers of the obligor and the 
ophg^e g ^ fae n a m e > sex^ residential address, Social Secu-
f"y dumber, and date of birth of each child for whom support 
18 sought. The petition must be accompanied by a certified 
C0PV of any support order in effect. The petition may include 
f1^ ^ther information that may assist in locating or identify-
" ^ \e respondent. 
'7 ' The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition 
^ d Accompanying documents must conform substantially 
Y1^ the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by 
federy j a w for u s e m cases filed by a support enforcement 
agency
 1W7 
W4Af-312. Nondisclosure of information in excep-
tional circumstances. 
a finding, which may be made ex parte, that the 
healt^ safety, or liberty of a party or child would be unrea-
sonably put at risk by the disclosure of identifying infonna 
t10n> or if an existing order so provides, a tribunal shall ordei 
^
a t the address of the child or party or other identifyin| 
""Orat ion not be disclosed in a pleading or other document 
*"
ec
* in a proceeding under this chapter. 199^  
78
-4&f-313. Costs and fees. 
(1) The petitioner may not be required to pay a filing fee 01 
other
 c o s t s 
^ If an obligee ptevails, a responding tribunal may assess 
^ ^ s t an obligor filing fees, reasonable attorneys' fees, other 
p 0 8 ^, and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses 
mcu
*red by the obligee and the obUgee's witnesses. The 
t r i b u ^
 m a v n o j . assess fees, costs,, or expenses against the 
?DU£ee or the support enforcement agency of either the 
" ^ ^ t i n g or the responding state, except as provided by law. 
A;tt0*ney's fees may be taxed as costs, and may be ordered paid 
a
^
rectly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the 
atto
*tiey's own name. Payment of support owed to the obligee 
n a s
 Priority over fees, costs, and expenses. 
(«*) The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and 
reasQnable attorneys' fees if it determines that a hearing was 
re(luSsted primarily for delay. In a proceeding under Part 6 a 
hear^g j s p r e s u m e d to have been requested primarily for 
delay $
 a registered support order is confirmed or enforced 
without change. 1997 
W4$f-314. Limited immuni ty of petit ioner. 
d' Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding before a 
responding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, 
o r
 through services provided by the support enforcement 
a
^
eT
^yi does not confer personal jurisdiction over the peti-
tion^j.
 m another proceeding. ' 
'7) A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process* 
whil^ physically present in this state to participate in a 
^^eding under this chapter. 
(3) Tne immunity granted by this section does not extend to 
° ™ Utigation based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under 
" ^ Chapter committed by a party while present in this state 
to
 P aHicipate in the proceeding. 199* 
78-4§f_3i5# N o n p a r e n t a g e a s defense . 
A fearty whose parentage of a child has been previously 
detei^njngd by
 o r pursuant to law may not plead nonparentage 8 8 a
 defense to a proceeding under this chapter. 1997 
78~4^f-316. Spec ia l rules of e v i d e n c e a n d procedure . 
y ^ The physical presence of the petitioner in a responding 
t r i b ^ a l of this s ta te is not required for the establishment, 
e n f ° r cement ,
 o r modification of a support order or the rendi-
tion ^f
 a judgment determining parentage. "k 
(2) A verified petition, affidavit, or document substantially 
c9gglying with federally mandated forms, and a document 
igEPj^orated by reference in any of Jthem, not excluded under 
*7e ^a rsay rule it given in personTis admissible in evidence, if
 r 
S l v e^ under oath by a party or witness residing in another 
state^ — -
(*' A copy of the record of child support payments certified 
a s a
 true copy of the original by the custodian of the record 
m a y be forwarded to a responding tribunal. The copy is 
^ " ^ n c e of facts asserted in it and is admissible to show, 
w n e %er payments were made. 
*J' Copies of bills for testing for parentage, and for prenatal 
a n
° Postnatal health care of the mother and child, furnished 
*° . e adverse party at least ten days before trial, are 
aa
^
m
*ssible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges 
billed ^ d that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and* 
^ tomary . 
(5> Documentary evidence transmitted from another state 
*°
 a
 Tribunal of this state by telephone, telecopier, or other 
m e a n s that do not provide an original writing may not be. 
excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of 
transmission. 
(6) In a proceeding under this chapter, a tribunal of this 
state may permit a party or witness residing in another state 
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or 
other electronic means at a designated tribunal or other 
location in that state. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate 
with tribunals of other states in designating an appropriate 
location for the deposition or testimony. 
(7) If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to 
answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incrimi-
nating, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from 
the refusal. 
(8) A privilege against disclosure of communications be-
tween spouses does not apply in a proceeding under this 
chapter. 
(9) The defense of immunity based on the relationship of 
husband and wife or parent and child does not apply in a 
proceeding under this chapter. 1997 
78-45f-317. Communicat ions b e t w e e n tr ibunals . 
A tribunal of this s tate may communicate with a tr ibunal of 
another s tate in writing, or by telephone or other means, to 
obtain information concerning the laws of tha t state, the legal 
effect of a judgment, decree, or order of tha t tribunal, and the 
status of a proceeding in the other state. A tribunal of this 
state may furnish similar information by similar means to a 
tribunal of another state. 1997 
78-45f-318. Ass i s tance w i t h discovery. 
A tribunal of this s ta te may: 
(1) request a tribunal of another state to assist in 
obtaining discovery; and 
(2) upon request, compel a person over whom it has 
jurisdiction to respond to a discovery order issued by a 
tr ibunal of another state. 1997 
78-45f-319. Rece ip t a n d d isbursement of payments . 
A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this s tate shall 
disburse promptly any amounts received pursuant to a sup-
port order, as directed by the order. The agency or tr ibunal 
shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of another s tate 
a certified s tatement by the custodian of the record of the 
amounts and dates of all payments received. 1997 
PART 4 
ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPORT ORDER 
78-45f-401. Petition to establish support order. 
(1) If a support order entitled to recognition under this 
chapter has not been issued, a responding tribunal of this 
state may issue a support order if: 
(a) the individual seeking the order resides in another 
state; or 
(b) the support enforcement agency seeking the order 
is located in another state. 
(2) The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order 
if: 
(a) the respondent has signed a verified statement 
acknowledging parentage; 
(b) the respondent has been determined by or pursuant 
to law to be the parent; or 
(c) there is other clear and convincing evidence that the 
respondent is the child's parent. 
(3) Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, 
tha t an obligor owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue 
a support order directed to the obligor and may issue other 
orders pursuant to Section 78-45f-305. 1997 
PART 5 
ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE 
WITHOUT REGISTRATION 
78-45f-501. Employer's rece ipt of income-withholding 
order of another state . 
An income-withholding order issued in another state may be 
sent to the person or entity defined as the obligor's employer 
under Title 62A, Chapter 11, Par t 4, Income Withholding, 
without first filing a petition or comparable pleading or 
registering the order with a tr ibunal of this state. 1997 
78-451-502. Employer's compl iance w i t h income with-
holding of another s tate . 
(1) Upon receipt of an income withholding order, the obli-
gor's employer shall immediately provide a copy of the order to 
the obligor. 
(2) The employer shall treat an income withholding order 
issued in another state which appears regular on its face as if 
it had been issued by a tribunal of this state. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4) and 
Section 78-45f-503, the employer shall withhold and distribute 
the funds as directed in the withholding order by complying 
with terms of the order which specify: 
(a) the duration and amount of periodic payments of 
current child support, stated as a sum certain; 
(b) the person or agency designated to receive pay-
ments and the address to which the payments are to be 
forwarded; 
(c) medical support, whether in the form of periodic 
cash payment, stated as a sum certain, or ordering the 
obligor to provide health insurance coverage for the child 
under a policy available through the obligor's employ-
ment; 
(d) the amount of periodic payments of fees and costs 
for a support enforcement agency, the issuing tribunal, 
and the obligee's attorney, stated as sums certain; and 
(e) the amount of periodic payments of arrearages and 
interest on arrearages, stated as sums certain. 
(4) An employer shall comply with the law of the state of the 
obligor's principal place of employment for withholding from 
income with respect to: 
(a) the employer's fee for processing an income with-
holding order, 
(b) the maximum amount permitted to be withheld 
from the obligor's income; and 
(c) the times within which the employer must imple-
ment the withholding order and forward the child support 
payment. 1997 
78-45f-503. Compliance w i t h mult iple income with-
holding orders . 
If an obligor's employer receives multiple income withhold-
ing orders with respect to the earnings of the same obligor, the 
employer satisfies the terms of the multiple orders if the 
employer complies with the law of the state of the obligor's 
principal place of employment to establish the priorities for 
the withholding and allocating income withheld for multiple 
child support obligees. 1997 
78-45f-504. Immunity from civi l liability. 
An employer who complies with an income withholding 
order issued in another state in accordance with this part is 
not subject to civil liability to an individual or agency with 
regard to the employer's withholding of child support from the 
obligor's income. 1997 
78-45f-505. Penalt ies for noncompl iance . 
An employer who willfully fails to comply with an income 
withholding order issued by another state and received for 
78-45f-506 JUDICIAL CPDE 638 
e nf 0rcement is subject to the same penalties that may be 
imppsed for noncompliance with an order issued by a tribunal 
0 f trjds state. 1997 
7g^5f-506. Contest by obligor. 
( l) An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an 
m c ( ? me withholding order issued in another state and received 
c ^ c t l y by an employer m this state in the same manner as if 
the order had been issued by a tribunal of this state. Section 
78-45f-604 applies to the contest. 
$ ) The obligor shall give notice of the contest to: 
(a) a support enforcement agency providing services to 
the obligee; 
(b) each employer that has directly received an income 
withholding order; and 
(c) the person or agency designated to receive pay-
ments in the income withholding order or if no person or 
agency is designated, to the obligee. 1997 
7g_^5f-507. Administrative enforcement of orders. 
(\) A party seeking to enforce a support order or an income-
^ t p h o l d i n g order, or both, issued by a tribunal of another 
gta^e may send the documents required for registering the 
o r d l r to a support enforcement agency of this state. 
(^) Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement 
agency, without initially seeking to register the order, shall 
con^ider and, if appropriate, use any administrative procedure 
authorized by the law of this state to enforce a support order 
o r an income-withholding order, or both. If the obligor does not 
c o n i e s t administrative enforcement, the order need not be 
registered. If the obligor contests the validity or administra-
t e enforcement of the order, the support enforcement agency 
shaU a g i s t e r the order pursuant to this chapter. 1997 
PART 6 
ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT 
ORDER AFTER REGISTRATION 
7g^45f-601. Registrat ion of order for enforcement. 
p> support order or an income-withholding order issued by a 
tribunal of another state may be registered in this state for 
enforcement. 1997 
7g_45f-602. Procedure to register order for enforce-
ment . 
0) A support order or income-withholding order of another 
s t a t e may be registered in this state by sending the following 
documents and information to the appropriate tribunal in this 
state : 
(a) a letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting 
registration and enforcement; 
(b) two copies, including one certified copy, of all orders 
to be registered, including any modification of an order; 
(c) a sworn statement by the party seeking registration 
or a certified statement by the custodian of the records 
showing the amount of any arrearage; 
(d) the name of the obligor and, if known: 
li) the obligor's address and Social Security num-
ber; 
(ii) the name and address of the obligor's employer 
and any other source of income of the obligor; and 
(iii) a description and the location of property of 
the obligor in this state not exempt from execution; 
and 
(e) the name and address of the obligee and, if appli-
cable, the agency or person to whom support payments 
are to be remitted. 
(2) On receipt of a request for registration, the registering 
tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as a foreign judgment, 
together with one copy of the documents and information, 
r eg^rdless of their form. 
(3) A petition seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively 
sought under law of this state may be filed at the same time as 
the f equest for registration or later. The pleading must specify 
tha groumis for the remedy sought. 1997 
7g_45f-603. Effect of registration for enforcement. 
(j,) A support order or income-withholdmg order issued in 
another state is registered when the order is filed in the 
registering tribunal of this state. 
($j) A registered order issued in another state is enforceable 
m tJie same manner and is subject to the same procedures as 
an <?rder issued by a tribunal of this state. 
(#) Except as otherwise provided in this part, a tribunal oi 
thig state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a 
registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction. 1991 
7g^5f-604. Choice of law. 
(j,) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, 
amount, and duration of current payments and other obliga-
tion8 °f support and the payment of arrearages under the 
ord*r-
$ ) In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation 
under &e l a w s of this state or of the issuing state, whichever 
is l<7nger> applies. \Wi 
7g^5f-605. Notice of registration of order. 
(j,) When a support order or income-withholding ordei 
lagged in another state is registered, the registering tribunal 
shajl notify the nonregistering party. The notice must be 
^^mnanied ov, a cony of the registered order and the docu-
ments and relevant information accompanying the order. 
(£) The notice must inform the nonregistering party: 
(a) that a registered order is enforceable as of the date 
of registration in the same manner as an order issued by 
a tribunal of this state; 
(b) that a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement 
of the registered order must be requested within 20 days 
after notice; 
(c) that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of 
the registered order in a timely manner will result in 
confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order 
and the alleged arrearages and precludes further contest 
of that order with respect to any matter that could have 
been asserted; and 
(d) of the amount of any alleged arrearages. 
($) Upon registration of an income-withholding order for 
enforcement, the registering tribunal shall notify the obligor's 
employer pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4, Income 
Withholding. i*97 
7g^45f-606. Procedure to contest validity or enforce-
ment of registered order. 
(%) A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or 
enforcement of a registered order in this state shall request a 
hea*111^ within 20 days after notice of the registration. The 
nopifegiBi«nng party may se&L *u> ^ata'tfe "frife Tfegratratfiisn, *u> 
a^ert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the 
registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the 
amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to this section. 
(i) If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or 
enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner, the 
order is confirmed by operation of law. 
(3) If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest 
the validity or enforcement of the registered order, the regis-
tering tribunal shall schedule the matter for hearing and give 
notice to the parties of the date, time, and place of the hearing. 
1907 
*^tEe registered order, continue the proceeding to permit 
Production of additional relevant evidence, and issue other 
a/>propriate orders. An uncontested portion of the registered 
^der may be enforced by all remedies available under the law 
Q{ this state. 
(3) If the contesting party does not establish a defense 
u^der Subsection (1) to the validity or enforcement of the 
Q d^er, the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming 
t^e order. 1997 
70-45f-6O8. Confirmed order. 
Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of 
jaw or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of foe order with respect to any matter that could have been 
asserted at the time of registration. 1997 
70-45f-6O9. Procedure to register child support order 
of another state for modvfrcatioYu 
A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or 
to modify and enforce, a child support order issued in another 
state shall register that order in this state in the same manner 
provided in Sections 78-45f-601, 78-45f-602, 78-45f-603, and 
7#-45f-604 if the order has not been registered. A petition for 
modification may be filed at the same time as a request for 
registration, or later. The pleading must specify the grounds 
for modification. 1997 
70-45f-61O. Effect of registration for modification. 
A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of 
another state registered for purposes of modification, in the 
s#me manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of 
tljis state, but the registered order may be modified only if the 
requirements of Section 78-45f-611 have been met. 1997 
7$-45f-611. Modification of child support order of an-
other state. 
(1) After a child support order issued in another state has 
been registered in this state, the responding tribunal of this 
state may modify that order only if Section 78-45f-613 does not 
apply and after notice and hearing it finds that: 
(a) the following requirements are met: 
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor 
do not reside in the issuing state; 
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state 
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal juris-
diction of the tribunal of this state; or 
(b) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject 
to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state 
and all of the parties who are individuals have filed 
written consents in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of 
this state to modify the support order and assume con-
tinuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if 
the issuing state is a foreign jurisdiction that has not 
enacted a law or established procedures substantially 
similar to the procedures under this chapter, the consent 
otherwise required of an individual residing in this state 
is not required for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to 
modify the child support order. 
(2) Modification of a registered child support order is sub-
ject to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that 
apiply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of 
s^me manner. 
(3) A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a 
c^ild support order that may not be modified under the law of 
t^e issuing state. If two or more tribunals have issued child 
support orders for the same obligor and child, the order that 
controls and must be so recognized under Section 78-45f-207 
establishes the aspects of the support order which are 
n<?nmodifiable. 
(4) On issuance of an order modifying a child support order 
issued in another state, a tribunal of this state becomes the 
tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 1997 
7#-45f-612. Recognition of order modified in another 
state. 
A tribunal of this state shall recognize a modification of its 
earlier child support order by a tribunal of another state which 
assumed jurisdiction pursuant to a law substantially similar 
to this chapter and, upon request, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter, shall: 
(1) enforce the order that was modified only as to 
amounts accruing before the modification; 
(2) enforce only nonmodifiable aspects of that order; 
(3) provide other appropriate relief only for violations 
of that order which occurred before the effective date of 
the modification; and 
(4) recognize the modifying order of the other state, 
upon registration, for the purpose of enforcement. 1997 
70-45f-613. Jurisdiction to modify child support order 
of another state when individual parties re-
side in this state. 
(1) If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this 
state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a 
tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify 
tfre issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to 
register that order. 
(2) A tribunal of this state exercising jurisdiction under this 
section shall apply the provisions of Par ts 1 and 2, this part , 
afid the procedural and substantive law of this state to the 
proceeding for enforcement of modification. Parts 3, 4, 5, 7, 
a|id 8 do not apply. 1997 
7#-45f-614. Not ice to i s su ing tribunal of modification. 
Within 30 days after issuance of a modified child support 
0 r der, the party obtaining the modification shall file a certified 
copy of the order with the issuing tribunal that had continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order, and in each 
tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been 
registered. A party who obtains the order and fails to file a 
certified copy is subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal 
in which the issue of failure to file arises. The failure to file 
does not affect the validity or enforceability of the modified 
Q<der of the new tribunal having cont inuing exclusive juris-
diction. 1997 
PART 7 
DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE 
7#-45f-701. Proceed ing to determine parentage. 
( D A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating or 
responding tribunal in a proceeding brought under this chap-
7A-45f-607. Contest of registrat ion or enforcement . 
(1) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a 
egistered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the 
. ^1irden of proving one or more of the following defenses: 
jZ^-^*^"(a) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction 
>f^ over the contesting party; 
(b) the order was obtained by fraud; 
(c) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified 
by a later order; 
160 the issuing tribunal 'has stayed the order pending 
appeal; 
(e) there is a defense under the law of this state to the 
remedy sought; 
(f) full or partial payment has been made; or 
(g) the statute of limitation under Section 78-45f-604 
precludes enforcement of some or all of the arrearages. 
(2) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial 
^fense "under Subsection (1), g-tiibuiidl may BlaTelgbTcemegt 
ter or £ law substantially similar to this chapter or the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, to determine 
that the petitioner is a parent of a particular child or to 
determine that a respondent is a parent of that child. 
(2) In a proceeding to determine parentage, a responding 
tribunal of this state shall apply Title 78, Chapter 45a, 
Uniform Act on Paternity, and the rules of this state on choice 
oflaw. 1997 
PARTS 
INTERSTATE RENDITION 
78-45f»0Ol. Grounds for rendition. 
(1) For purposes of this part, "governor* includes an indi-
vidual performing the functions of governor or the executive 
authority of a state covered by this chapter. 
(2) The governor of this state may: 
(#) demand that the governor of another state surren-
der an individual found in the other state who is charged 
criipinally in this state with having failed to provide for 
the support of an obligee; or 
(I)) on the demand by the governor of another state, 
surrender an individual found in this state who is charged 
criipinally in the other state with having failed to provide 
for the support of an obligee. 
(3) A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsis-
tent with this chapter applies to the demand even if the 
individual whose surrender is demanded was not in the 
demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed and 
has not fled therefrom. 1997 
78-45f-£02. Condi t ions of rendi t ion . 
(1) Before making demand that the governor of another 
state &x>rrfcndeY an individual charged criminally in th&& state 
with having failed to provide for the support of an obligee, the 
governor of this state may require a prosecutor of this state to 
demonstrate that at least 60 days previously the obligee had 
initiated proceedings for support pursuant to this chapter or 
that the proceeding would be of no avail. 
(2) If* under this chapter or a law substantially similar to 
this chapter or the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act, the governor of another state makes a demand that 
the governor of this state surrender an individual charged 
criminally in that state with having failed to provide for the 
support of a child or other individual to whom a duty of 
support is owed, the governor may require a prosecutor to 
investigate the demand and report whether a proceeding for 
support has been initiated or would be effective. If it appears 
that a proceeding would be effective but has not been initiated, 
the governor may delay honoring the demand for a reasonable 
time to permit the initiation of a proceeding. 
(3) If a proceeding for support has been initiated and the 
individual whose rendition is demanded prevails, the governor 
may decline to honor the demand. If the petitioner prevails 
and the individual whose rendition is demanded is subject to 
a support order, the governor may decline to honor the 
demand if the individual is complying with the support order. 
1997 
PART 9 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
78-45f'90L Uniformity of application and construc-
tion. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 
subject of this chapter among states enacting it. 1997 
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CHAPTER 46 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Short title. 
J\3£<sra refected GSQSBL TO85&H&. cs<*«& ss&te&ii 
Opportunity and obligation to serve. 
Discrimination prohibited. 
Definitions. 
Trial by jury. 
Repealed. 
Persons competent to serve as jurors — r-ersons 
not competent to serve as jurors. 
Determination on juror qualification. 
Repealed. 
Master jury list — Inclusive — Review — Re^  
newal — Public examination. 
Repealed. 
Qualified jury list—Term of availability—Juror 
qualification form — Content — Completion — 
Penalties for failure to complete or misrepre-
sentation — Joint jury list for court autho-
rized. 
Repealed. 
Qualified prospective jurors not exempt trom 
jury service. 
Excuse from jury service. 
Jury not selected in conformity with chapter — 
Procedure to challenge — Relief available — 
Exclusive remedy. 
Preservation of records. 
Repeated. 
Limitations on jury service. 
Penalties for failure to appear or complete iurv 
service. 
Employer not to discharge or threaten employee 
for jury service — Criminal penalty — Civil 
action by employee. 
78-46-23. Repealed. 
78-46-1- Short t it le. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Jury7 
Selection and Service Act." 1979 'a 
78-46-2' Jurors selected from random cross section —*r 
Opportunity and obligation to serve. 
It is the policy of this state that persons selected for jury 
service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the 
population of the county, and that all qualified citizens have 
the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be consid-
ered for service and have the obligation to serve when sum-
moned for that purpose. 1993 
78-46-3* Discr iminat ion prohibited. 
A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt from jury service 
on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, 
occupation, disability, or economic status. 1992 
78-46-4. Definit ions. 
(1) "Clerk* or "clerk of the court" means the person so 
designated by title and includes any deputy clerk. 
(2) "Court" means trial courts. 
(3) "Jury* means a body of persons temporarily selected 
from the citizens of a particular county invested with power to 
present and indict a person for a public offense or to try a 
question of fact. 
